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-ABSTRACT OF OCEAN TRANSPORTATION OF CHEMICALS
The growth of the chemical industry over the past 30
years has contributed significantly to the increased
volume of hazardous cargo transported by ocean vessel.
The properties of some chemicals in commerce,
particularly intermediate products, are such that their
movement represents a risk to society in terms of environ-
mental damage, bodily injury and carcenogenic effects
that may not surface for years.
development of the ocean chemical
This study traces the
transportation system
with emphasis on the technology, management and
regulatory regime that has evolved to control these risks.
Selected incidents involving hazardous chemical cargoes
are reviewed, highlighting the industry and goverment re-
sponses. The study concludes that the present risk
management system is capable of supporting hazardous
chemical transportation at sea with minimal risk, with
two notable weaknesses; the shipowners reliance on the
cargo owner's selection of packaging and stowage for
intermodal transport, and the impact of human error on
the system of technological, managerial and regulatory
controls. The study endorces the International Maritime
Organization's efforts to create a liability regime
similar to that in effect for oil pollution liability.
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CHAPTER ONE
GENERAL INFORMATION AND BACKGROUND OF
CHEMICAL TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS
Introduction
The quantity of hazardous cargoes shipped at sea is
increasing and is now estimated to account for greater
than 50 percent of all cargoes shipped (Henry, 1985).
The growth in the transportation of hazardous cargoes has
taken place in the last 40 years, with chemicals
accounting for a large portion of this increase. Inter-
national concern over the risks inherent in the shipment
of these cargoes has been reflected in conventions and re-
solutione sponsored principally by the International Mari-
time Organization (IMO),
Nations.
under the auspices of the United
In the spring of 1984, the IMO sponsored a
conference on the Draft Convention on Liability and Com-
pensation in connection with the Carriage of Hazardous
and Noxious Substances by Sea (Draft HNS Convention). The
conference ended without reaching consensus, but served
to highlight the complexity of the issues involved in the
carriage of hazardous cargoes,
these risks.
and the management of
Tragic incidents, such as the Union Carbide chemical
release in Bopal India, serve to underscore the risks
that are assumed daily, usually by an unsuspecting
public. It is the intent of this study to provide a comp-
1
rehensive review o£ one segment o£ the hazardous cargo
population; chemicals. Armed with the necessary
background in£ormation on the technology, market, and
regulation o£ the transportation o£ chemicals, reasonable
conclusions can be drawn and recommendations made concern-
ing the International HNS Convention, and the
international policy goals this treaty represents.
Purpose
The ocean transportation o£ chemicals is socially and
economically necessary to modern man. Many o£ these chem-
icals represent a direct threat to human li£e,
cause seve~e environmental damage i£ released.
and can
The Dra£t
HNS Convention developed by the Legal Committee o£ the IMO
is an attempt to establish international policy on
liability and compensation in the event of such a release.
Proponents of the HNS Convention cite the international
liability regime established by the International
tion on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage
Conven-
<CLC,
1969) , and the International Fund £or Compensation £or
Oil Pollution Damage <Fund Convention, 1971), as prece -
dent £or catastrophic incident recovery, and support a
similiar regime Tor hazardous and noxious substances . The
insurance, vessel and cargo interests, however, con-
centrate on the di££erences between the carriage of oil
and the carriage of hazardous cargo, which complicate the
issues of assessing liability and
2
more importantly,
liability limitation. In any event, the risks involved in
the shipment of hazardous cargoes pose a significantly in-
creased threat to human life than petroleum, including
long term effects not immediately apparent. The liability
vulnerability period is potentially longer and deeper than
with petroleum products.
Concentration on the liability issues involved in
hazardous cargo transportation seems to assume that tragic
incidents will in fact occur. This assumption, on the
surface, appears casual; accepted by knowledgable
persons familiar with the shipping of hazardous cargoes,
including chemicals.
cahnot be eliminated.
It seems apparent that all risk
Hypothesie
Without getting into quantitative risk analysis
theory, this paper attempts to deal with the risks in -
volved in the ocean transportation of chemicals from the
political, technical, and managerial standpoint. Based
on the theory that acceptance of risk is more dependent on
confidence in risk management than on estimates of risk
consequences, probabilities, and magnitudes (Starr,
liability
the risk
the
to understand
before addressing
imperitiveisit
system
undated) ;
management
question.
This paper describes in eome detail the evolution of
the ocean chemical transportation system and the
3
regulatory regime that manages it. The review is £ollowed
by an analysis o£ selected incidents which supports £ind-
ings relative to the adequacy o£ these regulatory
measures. Finally, this paper hypothesises that in ad-
dition to the existing risk management system, an inter-
national liability and compensation regime is required.
Background
The emergence and growth o£ the chemical industry has
had a pro£ound e££ect on the economic and technical
development o£ civilization in the Twentieth Century.
Chemical products are £ound virtually everywhere,
many £orms; plastics, £ertilizers, adhesives,
and in
to name
a £ew (Gusman, VonMolke, Irwin, and Whitehead, 1980) .
Chemicals have played a pivotal role in the development o£
modern society, serving to enhance advances in
agriculture, technology, and medicine. International
trade o£ chemicals is o£ vital importance to the economic
well-being o£ many countries. just as the chemical
although the enthusiasm that characterized the
is practically
industry
potential
unlimited,
is dependent on access to world markets.
£or expansion o£ their utility
The
early decades o£ the industry has been tempered by the
emergence o£ health and environmental considerations.
About 50,000 chemicals are used commercially in the
United States. Some o£ these are clearly hazardous and
need to be handled in a SUitably controlled manner so that
4
the user is protected. Others are toxic only a£ter re-
peated exposure at levels too low to create untoward
immediate e££ects. Still others can cause cancer, yet
appear innocuous at the time o£ exposure and give no
indication o£ their presence. In many cases, no one,
including the manu£acturer, may know i£ a chemical
produces these long term e££ects (Gusman, VonMolke, Irwin,
and Whitehead, 1980).
The introduction o£ chemicals into world commerce has
regulations.accompanied by governmentalbeen
and international laws govern the
National
introduction,
transportation, trade, application, and disposition o£
chemicals. Early laws dealt principally with localized
sa£ety and health considerations, while more recent legi-
slation addresses broader environmental and public
concerns.
sa£ety
The sa£e and economical transportation of chemicals
and chemical products has been an evolutionary process,
characterized by close industry and government
cooperation. The technological base and entrepreneurial
spirit have been important ingredients in its development,
with human health and environmental considerations emer-
ging as public issues in the shipment o£ chemicals,
acting to complicate the purely economic and physical
resulting
conscientious
processesproblems.
reflects a
The system
and
£rom
timely
these
incorporation of
induztry and public priorities,
5
that strive to produce a
safe and economical ocean chemical transportation system.
Chemical Categories
From the industrial perspective there are three cate-
gories of chemicals;
end products.
feed stocks, intermediates, and
(a) Feedstocks: Most chemicals are synthesized from
natural gas, air, and various ores as basic
raw materials. These feedstocks are converted,
through variou~ processes, into intermediates
or end products. Due to heavy reliance on
petroleum products for raw materials, the trans-
portation requirements for feedstocl<;s are
generally satisfied in the same manner as energy
petroleum products.
(b) I ntermed iateE;: These are the products of chem-
ical processing of feedstocks. They normally
never reach a broad public, but are used as an
ingredient for more specialized chemical or man-
chemical companies and make up a
ufacturing
between
processes. They are often sold
large
percentage of chemicals transported by sea.
products of the chemical industry.
(c) End Products: These are the specialized
They may be
sold as an ingredient for a further
manufacturing process, but are sometimes sold
directly to consumers (Williams, 1973).
IS
The transportation of chemicals of interest to this
study is the distribution of intermediates and end
intermediates represents the
products.
transport
In general,
o£
the intra- or inter-industry
greatest
challenges to the carrier; as intermediates are more val-
uable, more hazardous, and most susceptible to
contamination (Williams, 1973>.
Intermediates result £rom either mixtures o£ £eed-
stocks or synthesized £eedstocks. The discrimination
between products o£ these processes is important in terms
o£ the characteristics o£ the intermediate. Formulated
blende or mixtures tend to exhibit composite
characteristic~ o£ the component £eedstocks. Synthesized
products, however, may be toLally di££erent £rom the
used£eedstocks
complexity o£
in reaction
intermediates
to create
is generally
them.
greater
The
than
£eedetocks; £ortunately, the volume o£ intermediates is
generally less than that o£ £eedstocks (Williams, 1973).
Special Considerations
The transport o£ intermediates requires extensive
sanitation. The level o£ contaminants is measured in parts
per million (PPM) £01' most o£ the chemicals where contami-
nation by virtually any source could render the entire
shipment uselese £01' additional processing. This
consideration e££ects transportation systems
particularly marine transportation - since seawater is a
7
ready source of contamination. The potential for
contamination has been a principle industry concern in the
development of marine chemical
(Holly, 1951).
transportation systems
There are other factors that have impacted the
development of chemical carrying ships. The significant
criteria are the characteristics of the products and the
market in which they trade. Construction standards and
safety features are based on the product's character-
istics, such as flamability, toxicity, stability, and
reactivity. Vessel size, capacity and cargo flexibility
arp based on the market, i . e. , the supply and demand of
product quantities on specific routes. As the chemical
industry matured, the vessel that maximized flexibility
in type and quantity of product has survived (Symon,
1981) .
The business of chemical manufacturing involves
processes that depend on a variety of transportation
mediums. Distances between sources o£ feedstocks and
initial processing sites, between primary and secondary
processing sites, and between final processing sites and
consumers combine to d8fine the transportation component.
This component is dynamic. During the early days of the
chemical industry, short-term profit maximizing often
meant reliance on less than ideal transportation networks,
while long-term planning could minimize overall costs
through efficient plant siting.
8
Based on the parameters
of the particular chemical company, ideal plant sites
were selected and trade routes and product quantities
defined.
It is not intuitively obvious what the ideal plant
location scheme should be. The cost of transporting large
quantities of less sensitive feedstocks must be balanced
against the cost of transporting lesser quantities of more
sensitive intermediates and end products. Additionally,
intermediates and end products move through a variable
distribution system to secondary processors and consumers.
The problem was particularly dynamic in the early years,
as new discoveries created new opportunities,
and more firms entered the business of chemicals.
An Overview
and more
Industry pioneers were working with incomplete infor-
mation. At the time, little was kn0wn about the cost of
transporting sensitive chemicals and there was no industry
record to analyze. Primary plant location was based on
access to feedstocks, which in this country meant the
u.s. Gulf Coast. Secondary processing plants were geo-
graphically dispersed among the industrial centers of the
and sited near consumer markets.country,
industry relied
Initially the
upon a land-based transportation system
incorporating rail and truck modes. The expansion to tug
and barge systems took advantage of intercoastal waterways
and river systems, and allowed economies of scale to
9
effect the cost of chemical transportation.
Barge transportation was ideal for domestic
the Mississippi River, and thedistribution,
intercoastal
utilizing
waterway to support deliveries of
intermediates to the industrial centers of the east coast
and middle America. The U.S. inland waterway system is
the cheapest, safest, and most energy-efficient mode of
transportation available for the movement of bulk products
and, particularly, bulk hazardous materials (Brown,
1985) . The transport of chemicals by barge is utilized
extensively £or domestic shipments in the U.S. and for
international shipments within the European continent.
The ocean transportation of chemicals in ship2 was an
inevitable result of the greater distances, over open
ocean, of international chemical trade between the U.S.
and Europe, and to the Far Fast.
The chemical industry expanded to meet the demand of
international markets developing in Europe and ultimately
depicts a graphic representation of chemical
wor I dwid •.=. This was not an overnight process,
slowly and steadily from the late 1950s.
but grew
Figure 1
waterborne
traffic, foreign and domestic, in the United States
between 1960 and 1984 (U.S. Department of the Army Corps
of Engineers, 1985). Comparing the curves for domestic
and foreign tonnage reveals three perceptible stages of
development.
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FIGURE 1
CHEMICALS MOVED BY WATERBORNE TRAFFIC
1960 - 1984
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1960 - 1965: Greater and increasing domestic
movement, and lesser and steady foreign
traffic.
1965 - 1975:
1975 - 1984:
Comparable growth in tonnage movement
in both domestic and foreign markets.
Domestic exceeds foreign.
Steady growth in domestic movement and
increasing growth in foreign movement.
Figure 1 indicates that in late 1983, foreign
chemical movement equalled and exceeded domestic movement.
The figures do not differentiate be~ween imports and
exports in the foreign category, and are based on tonnage
of product not value.
products transported,
They are indicative of chemical
and provide insight as to the mode
of transport. A great percentage of domestic transport
transport was by ship.
was by barge, however. the vast majority of foreign
Therefore there was a clearly
the development of the ocean
in the middle 1960s that
of chemical transportationamount ship
growing
by
is still
increasing
developing
today.
In subsequent chapters,
chemical carrier and the national and international
governmental regulations that have accompanied this
issues that are shaping the ocean chemical
industry are also analyzed.
development are explored. Additionally, the current
transportation
12
CHAPTER TWO
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
AND THE GROWTH OF THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET
The evolution o£ economical ocean transportation o£
chemicals was an incremental process, paralleling the
growth o£ the chemical industry itsel£. At any point in
time, it is re£lective o£ the industry's ability to
perceive international demand £or chemical products along
with development o£ £oreign chemical manu£acturing
capabilities. The economics o£ the chemical market
determine the products and quantities to be carried,
which in£luences the choice o£ transportation mode.
Today, chemical intermediates and products are
transported through the marine environment in a variety o£
ways: chemical carriers, containers, tank containers,
RORO vessels in tank trucks, LASH ships, and to a lesser
degree, bulk and break bulk ships (H~nry, 1985). Trends
indicate the emergence o£ one type o£ transport as
predominant, but considering the relative youth o£ the
industry and the changes that have emerged thus £ar, the
£uture is anything but certain.
The beginning o£ the chemical industry in the
United States evolved between 1930 and 1955. During this
period, the majority o£ chemicals transported in ships
were packaged in drums or bottles, and shipped as break
bulk cargo on liners (Cooperman, 1985) . Limited bulk
~hipments were transported in deep tanks on
13
liners as
liquid cargo. The £irst example o£ specialization £or
chemical carriage was in 1934 as the Marine Transport
Lines (MTL) Inc. £itted two deck tanks onboard the SS
MALCHASE specifically designed to handle an intermediate;
caustic soda liquor (The Versatile Marine Dow-Chem,
1954). Although the MALCHASE was lost during World War
II, MTL was quick to restore this capability with
similar tanks installed onboard SS MARINE TRANSPORT.
The liner companies suited the needs of chemical
manufacturers for product distribution, but the inter-
industry transport o£ intermediates appear to have
inspired the move toward specialized bulk chemical ships
(The Vers~tile Marine Dow-Chem, 1954) . MTL continued to
play a major role in this movement through a series of
ventures with major chemical companies.
In 1949, Dow Chemical Company signed a long -term
charter agreement with MTL for the exclusive use of the
first modifed chemical tanker. The SS MARINE CHEMIST , a
modified T-2 tanker, was used by Dow for the transport of
intermediates from Gulf ports to the east coast. She was
fitted with double bulkheads between product tanks to
prevent contamination and tank coatings to allow the
carriage of caustic soda and glycol (Tanker To Transport
Texas Chemicals, 1949) . The availability of surplus WW
II tankers was to stimulate other chemical companies to
experiment with bulk shipment o£ intermediates.
early 1950s, MTL was operating modi£ied chemical
14
By the
tankers
for other companies, such as Union Carbide's SS R.E.
WILSON (The Versatile Marine Dow-Chem, 1954).
The MARINE CHEMIST and the R.E. WILSON were represen-
tative of modified chemical tankers that served into the
middle 1960s. This generation of ships ranged from
12,000 to 20,000 Deadweight Tons (DWT), and were usually
fitted with segregation bulkheads dividing the cargo into
three or four product tank groups. Often these groups
were serviced by separate pump rooms, piping systems,
and ventilation systems (Cooperman, 1985). Tanks within
product groups could only be used for compatible cargoes,
requiring pipe and pump flushing between transfer of
different cargoes.
The subdivision and segregation of cargo areas was an
early response to one characteristic of the chemical
market that has consistently influenced ship design; the
demand for the transport of chemical intermediates and
products in less than ship-load quantities. This means
the employment of fewer multi-product ships meets the
demand more economically than a greater number of single
product tankers.
During this period, the liners were the primary
vessels for the carriage of chemical products, while
modified chemical tankers worked as industrial carriers
supporting industry movement of intermediates. These
trends continued until the 1960s, when two developments
- working separately but in parallel - would converge to
15
change the ocean chemical carriage industry. The £irst
was the emergence o£ purpose built chemical carriers that
were designed £rom the keel up to incorporate speci£ic
design criteria. The second was the expansion o£ the
chemical manu£acturing industry to Europe and the Far
East(Scuttling Tanker Rates, 1963).
Purpose Built Chemical Tankers
The £irst purpose built chemical tanker, the SS
MARINE DOIN-CHEM, was launched in 1954. She was a 16,000
DINT tanker, the product o£ a joint venture between two
experienced chemical transporters;
Inc. , and Dow Chemical Company.
Marine Transport Lines
The tanker incorporated
some unique cargo handling £eatures and could carry up to
eleven di££erent cargoes at one time. The MARINE DOW-CHEM
clearly mani£ested cargo diversity and quantity lessons
learned £rom the MARINE CHEMIST. The MARINE DOW-CHEM
stande as the £irat true chemical carrier; a class o£
vessel whose design has remained basically unchanged
through thirty years o£ industry development,
concepts o£ constuction were clearly re£lected
and whose
in both
national
1960s. 1
and international regulations developed in the
Construction Features
Rein£orced cargo tanks;
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cargo tanks were designed to
carry products of higher density than petroleum product
tankers. Crude oil has a Specific Gravity eSG) range of
0.85 to 0.95 compared to water at 1.00 SG. The MARINE
DOW-CHEM's cargo tanks were reinforced structurally to
carry products of up to 1.62 SG.
Tank segregation; the MARINE DOW-CHEM utilized double
bulkheads extensively for cargo segregation. Cofferdams
(voin spaces between adjacent tanks walls) were utilized
to segregate each center tank from the tanks just forward
and just aft. This is in contrast to conventional tanker
construction, which utilizes a single bulkhead as both
the after boundary of a forward tank. and the forward
boundary of the after tank. Figure 2 presents the MARINE
DOW-CHEM's profile and deck plans with these cofferdams
labelled.
Product segregation from the ocean was provided for
by the installation of wing tanks surrounding all center-
line tanks. The wing tanks were usuable for nonsensitive
cargoes or ballast water, or could be left dry to achieve
the maximum in cargo segregation. All centerline tanks
were constructed over a double bottom, which was
configured to serve as ballast tanks when the centerline
tanks were empty.
Tank Coatings
Two novel tank coating systems were used
17
in the
FIGURE 2
DECK, CARGO TANK AND MACHINERY DIAGRAM
SS MARINE DOW-CHEM
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MARINE DOW-CHEM. Both were specifically designed to
protect sensitive cargo from iron-salt contamination.
Six cylindrical tanks in No.1 hold were designed to
transport hydrochloric acid. They were lined with a
sper.ial rubber coating installed specifically for that
rubber coated tanks
cargo(Holly,
Tanks 5,
1951> .
7,
This seems to be the only example of
in service during the 1950s. 2
and 8 were specifically designed to
handle a 73 percent solution of caustic soda. At that
concent.ration, steam heating coils were required to
maintain t.he product. in the liquid state. Heated caustic
soda has greatly increased corrosive properties which
require special precautions. The MARINE DOW-CHEM was
equipped with nickel clad steel tanks to take advantag~ of
nickel's corrosive resistance. All associated pumps,
piping, valves, and submerged structures (ladder rungs
and heating coils> were made of solid nickel. The
practice of using specialized construction materials for
special products was new, and can be observed in modern
ships incorporating extensive use of stainless steel tanks
and fitting.£..
Cargo Transfer Systems
The MARINE DOW-CHEM presented a unique solution to
the problem of cargo contamination within pump and piping
internals. Selected cargo tanks were equipped with
19
separate cargo pumps and associated suction and discharge
piping. Manu£actured by the £ood division o£ the Peerless
Corporation, these deepwell pumps consisted o£ maindeck
mounted motors connected by sha£ting to the pump end in
the bottom o£ the tank. This novel approach eliminated
the need £or cargo pumprooms and associated problems when
handling toxic cargoes, and
requirements between cargoes.
reduced system £lushing
The deepwell pump design
was another success£ul adaptation that would endure in the
in the evolution o£ the modern chemical carrier.
Developing The Overseas Market
Up until the late 1950s the ocean transportation o£
chemicals was principally conducted by liners and modi£ied
tankers. The liners delivered products to consumers in
Europe and the Fer East, while the modi£ied chemical
tankers supported the £low o£ intermediates between
primary and secondary processors concentrated in the U.S.
The development o£ the chemical industry overseas was to
present two pro£ound impacts:
First, U.S. chemical products were in competition
with local products which compelled a reduction in product
transportation costs i£ U.S.
competit.ive.
manu£acturers were to remain
Second, it opened an international market. in
chemical intermediates £or which only a very
20
limited
transportation system existed.
The practice o£ shipping chemicals in liners came
under review as economizing measures were sought to
maintain competitiveness in the overseas markets. At the
time, overseas shipment o£ most intermediate chemicals
in bulk on tramp vessels was not £easible due to the
special sanitation and hazard £eatures required. The
stage was set, however, £or a new service which would
combine the economic advantages o£ tramp shipping with the
special £eatures o£ the modi£ied and purpose-built
c h e mi c a I tanker.
The introduction o£ the "parcel" tanker into the
ocean chemical transportation market was specifically
designed to meet these service requirements. The
competitive target for these vessels were the con£erence
liners, who had traditionally carried chemical cargoes in
both break buJk and deep tanks.
The Parcel Tanker Industry
In the late 1950s, European shipowners founded
tanker companies to provide liquid cargo service o£ less
than ship-load lots. The lots were coloquially re£erred
to as "parcels." These vessels entered service capable o£
carrying a wide variety of cargoes, including; liquid
chemicals, vegetable and animal oils, coconut and palm
oils, syrups, and molasses.
21
The high value commodities,
however, were liquid chemical intermediates, which drew
these ships to the U.S.
outbound chemical cargoes.
Gul£ Coast, in pursuit o£
Parcel
potential
service was attractive as the market had the
to bring economies o£ scale to the business of"
carrying chemicals. Two independent carriers, Parcel
Carriers Inc. and Chemical Chartering Inc. , were
predominant by 1963. They o££ered rates between 10 and 50
percent below comparable liner tari££s. The highest dis-
counts were available on most liquid chemicals, with
progressively less savings on more corrosive cargoes
(Scuttling Tanker Rates, 1963) . Both lines o££ered sche-
duled services on a contractual basis £or less than ship
load lots, operating a mix o£ converted petroleum tankers
similar to the MARINE CHEMIST, and purpose built ships
like the MARINE DOW-CHEM. By 1964, Parcel Tankers Inc.
operated £our 17,500-ton vessels providing monthly service
linking the Mediterranean, Northern Europe, the U.S.
East Coast, Gulf" Coast, Japan, Formosa and the Philli-
pines (Scuttling Tanker Rates, 1963).
The long-term success o£ the parcel tanker industry
was dependent upon their ability to secure liquid cargoes
£or the return voyage. Chemical products and
intermediates were the mainstay on outbound runs,
parcel tankers could not compete economically if"
but the
inbound
voyages were in ballast. Competing with the con£erence
liners f"or liquid chemical
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outbound cargoes was
immediately sucessful because the liners did not have the
capability to carry sensitive intermediates in bulk. The
competition for inbound non-chemical cargoes was intense,
because the liners were capable and had historically
carried those same liquid cargoes.
Competing as independents on regularly scheduled runs
the parcel carriers were susceptible to a variety of liner
conference techniques which had the effect of reducing the
economic advantage of bulk shipment. Dual rate schemes,
and the use of "fighting" committees were employed to
minimize independent competition. 3
These techniques would have presented significant
obstacles to the sucessful development of the parcel
tanker industry. However, in 1958 - in the Isbrandtsen
case - the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that
the use of dual-rate contract systems as a "Predatory
Device" was in violation of the Shipping Act of 1915 (U.S.
Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Antitrust
SubcomlTli t tee, 19(2). This ruling cast doubt on the
validity of established U.S. liner industry pricing
practices and encouraged further congressional investiga -
tion. The findings led to the 1952 amendments to the
Shipping Act of 1915 and the federal bureaucracy that
regulated the U.S. shipping industry. These well publi-
sized events weakened the liner conferences hold on
international shippiIlg, and contributed to the market
climat~ that fostered the successful development of the
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parcel tanker trade.
The parcel tanker was designed to cater to the
chemical industry, but its construction also made it
ideal £or the transport o£ vegetable, £ish, and animal
oils. Due to the combined e££ect o£ lower costs resulting
£rom bulk carriage and the weakened position o£ the
liners since the Isbrandtsen decision,conf"erence
vegetable and animal oil market presented an
the
ideal
opportunity. Parcel tankers entered the Phillipines coco-
nut oil and Malaysian and Indonesian palm oil trades which
provided pro£itable return cargoes to both the U.S. and
Europe (Rogers, The lower cost of" transportation
and the opening of" specialized service linking Europe and
the Far East stimulated interest in new markets which
would have been impossible under liner rates (Scuttling
Tanker Rates, The subsequent industrialization of"
Far Eastern developing countries resulted in additional
liquid exports, including ref"ined palm oil products that
demand sanitation and purity standards rivaling the most
sensitive intermediate chemical.
The ability of" the parcel tanker to carry a variety
of" liquid cargoes in small to medium quantities with a
varied range o£ sensitivity characteristics was the key
element in their successf"ul development. The industry was
prof"itable and f"lourished. The closure of" the Suez Canal
in 1'367 increased the demand £or crude oil tankers,
thereby decreasing the prof"itability of" purchasing and
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converting standard oil tankers into chemical carriers.
Ships added to the parcel trade after 1967 were
predominently new bUildings, constructed to meet U.S.
Coast Guard standards, and incorporating the
technological
CHEM.
features introduced in the SS MARINE DOW-
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CHAPTER THREE
THE MODERN CHEMICAL CARRIERS
The development o£ ocean chemical transportation
technology in the 1950s and 1960s supported a rapidly
expanding chemical manu£acturing industry. O£ the three
principle types o£ vessels carrying chemicals; the
industrial carrier, the liner vessel, and the parcel
tanker, the latter was emerging as the principle carrier
£or the world's chemical cargoes.
Industrial Carriers
By 1970, chemical industry long-term planning
included access to deep-water terminals as a critical
£actor in plant site selection, and modest sized
industrial £leets were purchased to meet their own
domestic processing needs (Bulk Transportation, 1968) .
Most major U.S. chemical companies owned or operated their
own £leets at one time or another, but they seldom
generally relied on
required more than two to £our ships at a time,
parcel tanker operators £or
and
their
international shipments. It was also common £or
industrial carriers to contract out their excess space on
the spot liquid bulk chemical market.
The outlook £or the 1970s was optimistic. Both the
chemical industry and the parcel tanker industry were
£orecasting continued growth in product movement.
enthusiasm grew despite
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the gradual dispersal
This
o£
traditional intermediate sources from the U.S. Gulf Coast
to regional centers in Europe, Japan, and the U.S. Gulf
Coast (Chemical Shipping:
Full Steam, 1972).
Parcel Tankers Plow Ahead Under
The Liners
The liners continued to command a share of the
chemical market. The erosion of the power of liner
conferences through the 1960s stimulated the search for
service oriented initiatives to preclude further erosion
of traditional cargoes, and to capture a market share of
future cargoes. For the chemical industry, the liner
services continued to play an important role in product
distribution as the advantages of containerization were
appealing (Big Boost For Simple Shipping, 1966). Chemical
producers found initiatives such as liquid tank containers
and dry-bulk container inserts could reduce freight rates
as much as 12 percent over traditiona l break bulk methods,
while reduced handling requirements cut contamination and
damage losses. Although the resulting freight rates were
higher than bulk shipment in parcel tankers, they
supported timely shipment of orders when the only economic
alternative was to wait until enough orders justified a
parcel tanker shipment (Big Boost For Simple Shipping,
1966) .
Other liner service initiatives were successful in
regional markets. For example,
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Lykes Brothers Steamship
Company's LASH vessels supplied chemical barge delivery to
overseas ports. This direct tie between the U.S. waterway
system and overseas waterway systems has similar
advantages to other intermodal services (Bulk
Transportation, 1968). Roll-on roll-o££ operators, such
as Trans-American Trailer Transport, provided direct link
services between continental U.S. highway chemical
delivery systems and overseas users (Down To The Seas In
Roll-on Trailerships, 1970). The principle mode,
however, remained container vessels in both standard
packaged containers and liquid and dry bulk containers.
The Parcel Tankers
The parcel tanker business was a demonstrated success
by 1968. Pro£its were high while chemical industry demand
£or space on these vessels exceeded supply. New entrants
were attracted to the market, which served to increase
competition and stimulate growth and change in the
chemical industry itsel£. The U.S. Gul£ Coast remained a
principle supply source £or intermediates, but the
development o£ the chemical industry overseas
routes £or the growing parcel tanker industry.
opened new
European
and Japanese primary processors were gaining larger and
larger shares o£ regional intermediate markets, and
emerging coastal chemical carriers £rom the Far East were
competing £or these new cargoes.
From 1958 to 1968, the parcel carrier business had
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grown from four companies with nine ships to seven
companies with 58 ships. Available tonnage had increased
sixteenfold, while average ship size increased from 5000
DWT to 12,000 DWT (Chemical Ocean Going Tankers, 1968).
The fleet was a mix of sophisticated parcel tankers and
converted petroleum tankers, ranging in size from 1000
DWT coasties, to 30,000 DWT ocean vessels. The increase
size of the new-built parcel tankers was a response to the
emergence of competition between parcel carriers, as each
sought to maximize advantage of the economies of scale.
During this period prices on the spot shipping market were
relatively high and major shippers were willing to sign up
for high volume, long-term contracts. Parcel tanker
operators, however, preferred to maintaim a mix of long-
term contract business and spot market work.
The ocean chemical transportation industry was
maturing, and demonstrating characteristics that would
shape the future of the industry. A shift in emphasis
occured around 1970 as technological advances gave way to
business iniatives as the common denominator of the
successful operator. The parcel tanker had competed
successfully with the liners of the 1960s, based on
technological differences which supported the transport of
bulk liquid cargoes. The deciding competition during the
19705 would be between parcel tanker carriers,
emphasizing lower operating costs,
convenience of service.
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route selections, and
There were three significant political and economic
developments that would impact the stability of the parcel
tanker market through the 1980s; the closure of the Suez
closure of the Suez Canal,
and the oil crisis.Canal, the IMO chemical code,
from 1967 until 1975,
The
is
remembered for its its impact on the transportation of
petroleum products from the Middle East. Due to the
dependence of chemical
petroleum feedstocks,
intermediates and products on
the chemical industry was also
impacted . The canal closure compelled the transport of
Middle East oil around the continent of Africa, rather
than through the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean and
Europe. This had the effect of creating increased demand
for petroleum tankers, and shipping prices rose sharply
in response. Higher feedstock transportation costs meant
higher prices at each link in the chemical production
chain. The higher prices for intermediates and products
created a reduced demand, which meant less volume of
traffic in these cargoes. Reduced volumes in chemical
traffic had minimal immediate impact on the parcel tanker
into the petroleum product business.carriers
market,
chemical
as it was offset by the cross-over of some
The product carriers themselves could earn higher rates
hauling crude oil around Africa, as the lengthened oil
routes from the Middle East to European markets required
additional ships to keep the pipeline full. Ultimately,
the construction of Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC) and
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Ultra Large Crude Carriers (ULCC), with their
accompanying economies o£ scale, would eliminate this
market opportunity. Indirect e££ects o£ the canal closure
also included increased operating costs in response to
higher oil prices and greater ship construction costs, as
shipyard order books were £illed to capacity.
The adoption, in 1971, o£ the IMO Code £or the
"Construction and Equipment o£ Ships Carrying Dangerous
Chemicals in Bulk" provided international standards £or
the parcel tanker industry. Traditionally, it had been
international practice to apply new standards only to
ships constructed a£ter the standards had been adopted.
However, due to port sa£ety considerations, the chemical
code called £or the phased upgrading o£ existing chemical
tankers to be completed by 1978 (Lakey, 1984). To the
parcel tanker owners, this mandated major conversion, or
scrapping, o£ 35 percent o£ the existing parcel tanker
£leet by 1978 (Chemical Shipping: Parcel Tankers Plow
Ahead Under Full Steam, 1982). The encouraging market
picture that existed in 1971 in£luenced most parcel tanker
operators to commit an to aggressive shipbuilding program
in the 1970s.
The oil crisis was to be the most signi£icant event
impacting the parcel tanker industry in the 1970s. The
reduced £low o£ £eedstocks to the chemical industry
resulted in increased demand which predictably led to
increased prices. Instead o£ establishing a
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revised
supply/demand equilibrium, energy and £eedstock con-
sumers began to hoard petroleum as protection against
even higher prices. This tactic was also prevalent among
secondary and tertiary chemical processors as the demand
£or intermediates rose to £i11 existing storage
£acilities. The demand £or parcel carriers increased
correspondingly, resulting in £reight rates in October
1973 that ran at levels up to 100 percent, and in extreme
cases 150 percent, higher than 1972 rates (Hyde, 1973) .
The largest parcel tanker operator in the industry
reported pro£its in 1974 that were 10 times higher than
ever previously experienced (Stolt-Nielsen, 1984).
Facing the regulatory obsolescence o£ one third o£
the parcel tanker £leet because o£ the IMO chemical code,
prudent owners ordered larger capacity, highly
sophisticated parcel tankers. These new buildings,
ordered during or a£ter 1973, were at costs approaching
productionthe chemical
three times the cost o£ a similar capacity ship contracted
in 1970 (Hyde, 1973 ).
By the summer o£ 1975,
pipeline was £ull and storage capacity was £ull; the
movement o£ intermediates slowed precipitously. The
short-run hoarding was over, and the long-run market
adjustments to higher £eedstock prices sur£aced, predict-
ably, as decreased sales o£ products and intermediates.
Producers drew required intermediates £rom stocks on hand,
reducing the movement o£ these cargoes to a relative
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trickle. By the summer of 1975, available chemical
shipping capacity exceeded available cargoes, and rates
fell sharply as carriers competed for the few cargoes
remaining.
The Recession
The chemical shipping recession lasted from 1975
until 1979. The depth of the recession appears to have
been aggravated by the timing of the three significant
events just described; the higher construction costs
resulting from the massive shipbuilding program following
the closure of the Suez Canal, regulatory obsolescence of
one third of the existing fleet by 1978, and higher
operating costs and reduced cargo volumes caused by the
oil crisis. The boom market of 1973 and 1974 had
encouraged shipbuilding commitments and discouraged long-
term contracts, leaving the ship-owner dependent upon a
severely recessed spot market to make ends meet.
The recession was characterized by fierce competition
which drove ship-owners to reduce operating expenses.
Initiatives that were successful gained popular support
throughout the industry, and in some cases influenced
industry developments beyond the immediate recession. The
most notable of these were:
Fuel Efficiency
New buildings were diesel-powered and designed to
33
burn less and cheaper grades o£ £uel. Fleet-wide speed
reductions were implemented reducing consumption and
stretching the available cargo over more ships
Ship Rates Seen At Bottom, 1975).
Intermodalism
(Chemical
Port costs were rising in response to higher labor
and energy costs and out o£ environmental considerations.
These environmental costs were indirect, resulting £rom
port movement restrictions which limited chemical ship
arrivals, departures, and berth shi£ts to hours o£ day-
light. Additionally, the new sophisticated vessels were
capable o£ o££-loading their cargo at rates exceeding the
capacity o£ many terminals to receive them. The terminal
improvements envisioned when these ships were designed
were delayed due to the impact o£ the recession on
terminal revenues. Finally, these ships were o£ten
required to o££-load at several terminals within one port,
and at several ports in a geographic vicinity £ollowing
each voyage. Freight rates would no longer support these
long and increasingly expensive turnarounds.
The industry's desire to trim port costs and reduce
turnarounds motivated large scale investment in shore
terminal £acilities. Company owned terminals translated
into reduced turnaround time £or vessels, as they are
assured priority berthing and technologically compatible
o££-load £acilities. The industry direction was clearly
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toward one stop off-loads for vessels where the terminal
received all cargo products from the ship, and handled
intra-harbor and local deliveries (Stolt-Nielsen, 1984).
Recovery
The recovery from the recession of 1975 through 1979
was a gradual process in response to increased trade flow
in chemicals and reduced
chemical carrying ships.
tonnage in the world fleet of
Improved economies developed
during the recession in fuel consumption and reduced in
port turnaround would remain as industry features in the
19808.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE REGULATORY REGIME:
CARGO AND CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS
Regulation of the ocean chemical transportation
industry is a national regime of flag state control, with
strong influence by international conventions and
resolutions. The international body for the coordination
of shipping activities is the International Maritime
Organization (IMO>, which prior to 1982 was the Inter-
Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO>.4
The convention which formed the IMO was adopted in 1948
but the agency did not become operational until 1959.
Since then it has been the predominate international body
addressing shipping issues. Due to strong support of the
work of the IHO by the shipping nations of the world, the
IMO's products, both conventions and resolutions, have
had tremendous impact on the world shipping industry,
even if not ratified or adopted by the flag state.
The chemical transportation industry is now regulated
along three main thrusts; cargo controls, ship
construction controls,
liability controls.
and most recently pollution
This triad has developed
incrementally, as the sophistication of cargoes and the
ships that carry them have grown. The pollution liability
regime is a general response to increasing environmental
and public safety concerns since the 1960s, reflecting
society's reaction to the increased volume of traffic in
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hazardous cargoes.
This chapter traces the development o£ cargo and ship
construction codes, including the International Maritime
Dangerous Goods <IMDG) Code and the Code £or the
Construction and Equipment o£ Ships Carrying Dangerous
Chemicals in Bulk <aka The Chemical Code).
Cargo Regulation
The regulation o£ dangerous or hazardous cargoes
£irst appeared near the end o£ the nineteenth century, as
the resources and products o£ the industrial revolution
were being gathered and distributed on steam ships.
Section 301 o£ the British Merchant Shipping Act o£ 1894
was titled "Dangerous Goods and Carriage o£ Cattle", and
prohibited the transport o£ explosives, vitriol, luci£er
matches, guano and green hides on vessels carrying
passengers. Additionally Section 446 required shippers o£
hazardous cargoes and any other goods of aspeci£ied
dangerous nature to mark the nature o£ the goods
distinctly on the outside o£ the package and to give the
master o£ the vessel notice as to their nature (Henry,
1985). The approach o£ this early legislation was to
prohibit the carriage o£ hazardous cargoes on passenger
ships, and to require labeling and noti£ication of the
hazardous nature o£ cargoes on all ships. The eventual
disappearance of ocean going passenger vessels would
obviate the impact of that portion of this precedent on
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today's shipping market, but the identification and
labeling of packaged hazardous cargoes has matured
the sophisticated international system in use today.
into
International law addressed the issue of hazardous
cargo for the first time in the International Convention
on the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) of 1914. Although
this convention never entered into force, it did
establish international precedent for the concept of
national responsibility over the identification and pack-
aging of hazardous materials. Article 55 entitled Fire
Protection, reads:
(1) The carriage, either as cargo or
goods which by reason of their nature,
mode of stowage, are, either
collectively, likely to endanger the
passengers or the safety of the
forbidden.
ballast,
quantity,
singly
lives of
vessel,
of
or
or
the
is
(2) The government of each high contracting party
shall, from time to time by official notice, de-
termine what goods are to be considered dangerous
goods, and shall indicate the precautions which must
be taken in the packaging and stowage thereof
(Wilson, 1914).
Note the apparent reference to reactivity between
cargoes in use of the phrase, either singly or
collectively. This aspect of the hazardous cargo regime
increases
develops.
in significance as product sophistication
The SOLAS convention of 1929 was the second attempt
at international regulation to deal with hazardous
cargoes. Article 24 contained language very similar to
th~ 1914 instrument, and was identical in its reliance on
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national law for the identification, packaging and
stowage of hazardous cargo. The principle difference
between the two conventions was that SOLAS 1929 did enter
into force in 1933 <Henry, 1985).
It is apparent from reading both SOLAS documents that
the principle concern which influenced the attention to-
ward hazardous cargo was the safety of the ship, its
passengers and crew. At the time these conventions were
drafted, the amount of hazardous cargoes in world
commerce was relatively small, and the concept of
environmental consequences had not surf"aced. The
incidents that motivated international action were focused
on loss of life at sea, not on public safety or
environmental
ship.
concerns beyond the skin of the individual
The reliance on national controls by the f"lag state
to identif"y, package and stow hazardous cargoes resulted
in a myriad of differing rules and regulations between
flag states (Henry, 1985). As the quantity of" these goods
increased, more and more diversity emerged,
particularly between the developed and developing states.
In the late 1940s, the emergence of the chemical industry,
with its unique cargo requirements, emphasized the need
for international standards in the identification,
aging and stowage of hazardous cargoes <Henry,
pack-
1985).
was the competition presented by
An additional factor,
developed countries,
fueling the growing concerns of"
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£lags o£ convenience shipping in the world market. The
practice o£ registering vessels in £oreign countries, to
take advantage o£ lower operating cost and taxes, was
gaining in popularity among U.S. ship-owners. Disparities
in regulations, typically to the economic advantage o£
the Flag o£ Convenience (FOC) vessel, added tangible
incentives
regulation.
to the movement towards international
Two international agreements in 1948 re£lected the
perceived need £or increased cooperation in world
shipping; the IMO convention, and the SOLAS 1948
convention.
The IMO Convention
Signed on March 6, 1948 in London by 20 states,
the convention established the Inter-Governmental
Maritime Consultation Organization (IMCO, herea£ter
re£erred to as IMO)
purpose:
£or, inter alia, the £ollowing
(a) Provide machinery £or co-operation among
governments in the £ield o£ governmental regulation
and practices relating to technical matters o£ all
kinds a££ecting shipping engaged in international
trade, and to encourage the general adoption o£ the
highest practicable standards in matters concerning
maritime sa£ety and e££iciency o£ navigation (Con-
vention o£ the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consul-
tative Organization, 1958).
The convention included an interesting art icle
covering entry into £orc~ o£ the IMO. It required 21
states to accept the convention (only 20 states were
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signitories), including at least seven o£ which had a
total tonnage o£ not less than 1,000,000 gross tons o£
shipping each.
this clause was,
It is unclear what the desirp.d e££ect o£
but it would take ten years £or the
instrument to enter into £orce,
March 17, 1958.
SOLAS 1948
which it £inally did on
The SOLAS 1948 convention re£lected an increased
level o£ concern over the growth in international tra££ic
o£ hazardous cargo. An entire chapter (Chapter VI) was
devoted to the carriage o£ grain and dangerous goods, and
re£lected a distinctive shi£t in approach to hazardous
cargoes, relative to earlier SOLAS treaties. It
speci£ically identi£ied nine categories o£ dangerous
goods; a role which hereto£ore had been le£t to the
national government to identi£y. The list included:
1. explosives;
2. compressed, liqui£ied and dissolved gases;
3. corrosives;
4. poisons;
5. substances giving o££ in£lammable vapors;
6. substances which become dangerous by interaction
with water or air;
7. strong oxidizing agents;
8. substances which are liable to spontaneous com-
bustion; and
9. any other substance which experience has shown,
or may show, to be o£ such a dangerous character
that the provisions o£ this regulation should
apply to it.
Additionally, the convention added requirements £or
special precautions when carrying in£lammable liquids and
substances that are prone to spontaneous combustion.
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These precautions were not speci£ied,
the national governments to determine.
but were le£t to
SOLAS 1948 was
also the £irst international convention to require
distinctive labeling, and noti£ication to the shipper by
classj£ication categories provided in the convention (cat-
egories 1 through 9). The ship was then required to main-
tain a special list, setting £orth the dangerous goods on
board. Finally, the national government retained respon-
sibility £or regulating the packaging and stowage o£
dangerous goods (SOLAS, 1948).
The perceptible shi£t in international approach to
hazardous goods was aparently not, in itsel£, sufficient
£or the convention delegates. Recommendation 22, of the
SOLAS 1948 convention stressed the importance of
international uniformity in the sa£ety precautions appli-
cable to the carriage of dangerous goods by sea. The Con-
£erence recommended £urther study o£ the subject, with
the objective o£ drafting international regulations; and
added that the study should include the question of
marking dangerous goods by distinctive symbols and
designs, so as to distinguish them according to their
dangerous characteristics (Inglis,
convention declared that:
1984) . The SOLAS 1948
1. Goods should be considered dangerous on the basis
o£ their properties;
2. There was a need £or international uni£ormity in
the ea£ety precautions; and
3. A marking system should be considered
tinctive symbols to indicate the kind
for each class of substance.
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using dis-
of danger
subject of
establisheddangerous goods was by a committee of experts
The resolution stated that further study should be under-
taken with a view of drafting international regulations on
the subject. Action on this recommendation would await
the establishment of the IMO before being addressed
(Inglis, 1984).
The first work specifically on the
by the Economic and Social Council of the General Assembly
of the United Nations (ECOSOC) (Henry, 1985). The
committee of experts on the transport of dangerous goods
considered the international aspect of the carriage of
dangerous goods, by all modes of transport, and sub-
mitted its report in 1955. It relied heaVily on existing
national regulations and on work specifically done by
organizations concerned with specific modes of transport.
The aim of the effort was to achieve international uni-
formity to facilitate intermodal transport. The report
provided a general framework into which existing
regulations could be inserted and within which they could
be developed (Henry, 1985). Detailed regulations were to
be developed by organizations representing each specific
transportation mode. For the marine mode, that
organization was ultimately the IMO.
The IMO convention came into force in 1958, and the
organization met for the first time in 1959. One of its
first actions was to schedule the SOLAS 1950 conference
for the following year.
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SOLAS 1960
In its treatment of dangerous goods, SOLAS 1960
expanded on the efforts to focus the regulatory regime
that was initiated in SOLAS 1948. Chapter VII was devoted
entirely to the carriage of dangerous goods, and
reflected an increased level of specificity compared to
earlier international treatments of the subject.
ticular note were the following regulations.
Regulation 1:
Of par-
The regulation applied to all ships to which SOLAS
1948 regulations applied, except those excluded in the
following applicability provision:
(b) The provisions of this chapter do not apply to
particular cargoes carried in ships
specially built or converted as a whole for that
purpose, such as tankers (SOLAS, 1960).
This is an important provision for the ocean chemical
transportation industry, for it was during the interim
between SOLAS 1948 and SOLAS 1960 that the technological
developments underpinning the future growth of the
industry were made. This SOLAS 1960 provision, served as
official recognition of the uniqueness of purpose-built
bulk liquid chemical tankers like the MARINE DOW-CHEM
(1954), and converted chemical tankers such as the MARINE
CHEMIST (1949). Additionally, it emphasized that a gap
was developing between dangerous cargo regulation for
packaged or break-bulk chemicals, and the liquid bulk
chemicals. SOLAS 1960 maintained the traditional reliance
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on national governments to issue instructions on the
packing and stowing o£ dangerous goods, however,
Regulations 3 and 4 would provide speci£ic considerations
that the national regulations must address.
Regulation 2:
The identi£ication o£ dangerous goods was addreesed
similarly to the 1948 convention with some expansion o£
gerous cargoes:
Class 1
Class 2
Class 3
Class 4 (A)
Class 4 (B)
Class 4 (C)
Class 5 (A)
Class 5 (B)
Class 6 ( A )
Class 6 (B)
Class 7
Class 8
Class 9
categories to recognize increased sophistication o£ dan-
- Explosives. -
- Gases: compressed, liqui£ied or dis-
solved under pressure.
- In£lammable liquids.
- In£lammable solids.
- In£lammable solids, or substances, li-
able to spontaneous combustion.
- In£lammable solids, or substances,
which in contact with water emit in-
£lammable gases.
- OXidizing substances.
- Organic peroxides.
- Poisonous (Toxic) substances.
- In£ectious substances.
- Radioactive substances.
- Corrosives.
- Miscellaneous dangerous substances,
that is any other substance which ex-
perience has shown, or may show, to be
o£ such a dangerous character that the
provisions o£ this chapter should apply
to it (SOLAS, 1960).
Regulations 3 through 7 deal with packing, labeling,
documenting and stowing; these regulations identi£y areas
that national regulations must address. The £ollowing
examples are o££ered as indicative o£ the incremental
standardization process as international law subtly
:focused
issues.
the attentions o:f national law makers on Apeci£ic
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Regulation 3:
(A) The packaging of dangerous goods shall be
of such a character that any interior surface with
which the contents may come in contact is not
dangerously affected by the substance being conveyed
(C) Receptacles containing dangerous liquids shall
have an ullage at the filling temperature sufficient
to allow for the highess temperature during thecourse of normal carriage.
Regulation 4:
Each receptacle containing dangerous goods shall be
marked with the correct technical name (trade names
shall not be used) ...
be
the
be
(A) Dangerous goods shall
appropriately according to
incompatible goods shall
another (SOLAS, 1960).
stowed safely and
nature of the goods,
segregated from one
than
Although SOLAS 1960 was considerably more specific
any previous international regulation of dangerous
goods, it still fell short of the expectations of
attendees. The convention made specific recommendations
(Recommendation 56) that:
(A) Contracting governments should adopt a unified
international code for the carriage of dangerous
goods at sea; and
(B) The organization should pursue its studies, in
cooperation with the Committee of Experts, on such
an international code ..• and should cover, .•. ,
( i )
( i i )
(iii)
(SOLAS,
packing;
container traffic; and
stowage, with particular reference to the
segregation of incompatable substances
1960).
With this recommendation, all doubt is removed as to the
direction of international regulation of dangerous goods
at sea, and the IMO had its mandate to develop a uniform
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code for such regulation. The product of this effort,
the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG) was
adopted by the IMO assembly in 1965.
The IMDG Code
The development and adoption of the IMDG Code by IMO
is characterized by three principle features. First, it
is a comprehensive treatment of the carriage of packaged
dangerous goods, equally applicable to any mode of land
or water transportation. Second, it is divided into two
sections; a general regulatory section, which requires
IMO assembly approval to amend; and a technical part
containing the specifications relating to substances,
which may be amended by a majority vote of the members of
the marine safety committee of the IMO. This amendment
feature allows the technical flexibility required to
maintain currency of the code, without waiting for action
by the bi-annual IMO assembly. Third, the code was
Although it has
designed to provide national governments a ready-to-adopt
dangerous goods code to fufill all requirements tasked by
Chapter VII of the SOLAS 1960 convention. A summary of
the substantive elements of the IMDG Code is provided in
Appendix I.
The IMDG Code is a recommendation.
been linked by footnote to the 1974 SOLAS convention,
which is binding on parties,
Code is still voluntary.
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the adoption of the IMDG
The United States and the IMDG Code
The United States was £aced with a dilemma with the
packaging and stowage o£ dangerous goods £or
approval
labeling,
of the IMDG Code. National regulations £or the
transport had been in existence since the early part o£
the twentieth century, and were well established and
en£orced across the country. To change systems would
compel tremendous impact on the domestic transportation
industry,
transport.
the majority of which has no contact with ocean
The U.S. regulations are contained in the Code
of Federal Regulations, Title 49, under the auspices o£
the Department of Transportation (DOT). The solution to
this dilemma has been quite simple; the general approach
taken has been to permit compliance with certain
provisions of the IMDG Code in lieu of the corresponding
domestic requirements. In 1976, the DOT regulations were
amended to allow dangerous goods (except explosives and
which are being imported into or
to be accepted and transported by
radioactive materials),
exported from the U.S.,
vessel when classified, described, certified, packaged,
marked, labelled and placarded in accordance with the IMDG
Code (Henry, 1985).
Ship Construction Regulation
By the middle of the 1960s, the ocean transportation
of liquid chemicals in bulk was an established and growing
component of the shipping industry. The design and
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operation o£ the early vessels developed with the support
o£ the chemical industry in the United States, operating
principally as U.S.-£lag industrial carriers. The £irst
chemical movements by water, however, were interrmediate
products carried in barges on rivers and on the inland
waterway. The regulations governing bulk cargoes began in
response to concerns over the transportation o£ bulk
chemicals on the rivers and inland waterways, and later
expanded to the ocean carriers as the technology and the
market developed.
The Chemical Transportation Advisory Committee
The Shipping Act o£ 1936 gives the U.S. Coast Guard
<USCG) the authority to establish rules and regulations
£or the design, maintenance, and operation o£ vessels
carrying £lammable and combustible liquid cargoes in bulk
(Williams, 1983). In 1949, the American Petroleum Insti-
tute <API) and the Manu£acturing Chemists Association
provided expert volunteers to support the USCG
(MeA)
(CMA»
(Today the Chemical Manu£acturers Association
in
preparing some standard rules and regulations £or the bulk
carriage o£ hazardous materials in tank barges. The API-
MCA Ad Hoc Advisory Panel o£ 1949 would gradually evolve
into the Chemical Transportation Advisory Committee
(CTAC), which today provides voluntary assistance to the
USCG in its rulemaking e££orts (Lakey, 1984).
The appearance o£ £oreign-£lag chemical tankers load-
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ing hazardous intermediates in U.S. Gulf Coast ports in
the early 1960s generated concern over the safety of
such operations. Although federal regulations £or
chemical barges were in development, no rules existed for
chemical ships. As concern over chemical ship operations
in U.S. ports increased, the Secretary of the Treasury
directed a priority program to develop and implement
rules to regulate U.S.-flag chemical ship and foreign-flag
chemical ship operations in U.S. ports.
The ensuing effort, utilizing input from the Academy
of Sciences and the API -MCA Ad Hoc Advisory Panel,
resulted, in 1965, in the incorporation of Rules for
the Carriage of Hazardous Cargoes into Title 46 (shipping)
of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Foreign-flag
vessels operating in U.S. ports were made subject to this
code under the jurisdiction of the Coast Guard Captains of
the Port, pursuant to the authority of 33 CFR, Part 6
and in accordance with CFR, Part 124 (Code of Federal
Regulations, Title 46, 1985). Effective 30 September
Certification
1965,
were
foreign-flagged vessels operating in
required to obtain USCG Letters of
U.S. ports
prior to loading hazardous cargoes.
The Chemical Code
on
1967,
the
The IMO became involved in chemical cargoes in
when acting upon a proposal from the United States,
Maritime Safety Committee established the Subcommittee
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Ship Design snd Equipment (Lakey, 1984). The
subcommittee's terms of reference included the following:
to consider the construction and equipment of
ships carrying bulk cargoes of dangerous chemical
substance, and to recommend suitable design
criteria, construction standards and other safety
measures to minimize the risks involved in loading,
carrying and discharging such cargoes (Lakey, 1984).
The principle parties on the subcommittee were
the flag states of chemical ship operators; the Federal
Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Virtually all particip~nts operated vessels that were
already complying with the U.S. regulations. The
formulation of the Code for the Construction and Equip-
ment of Ships Carrying Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk (The
Chemical Code) was relatively swift, and was adopted in
1971 as assembly Resolution A.212(VII).
The Code addressed five main areas of chemical tanker
regulation:
1. Cargo Containment:
Three levels:
Type I - cargoes having the greatest reaching
effects beyond the immediate neigh-
borhood of the vessel
Type II - significant hazard to ship and crew
if released
Type 111- remaining products covered by the
Code
Containment standards, in terms of double
bottom and distance of cargo tank from outboard
skin of the ship, differed by type, being most
stringent for Type I. Damage absorption
criteria are applied to each type, to insure
survivability following collision or stranding.
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2. Cargo Segregation:
Applies standards £or cargo separation in terms
o£; co££erdams, voids, separate piping
systems and cargo ventilation systems. These
features are utilized to insure isolation o£
highly reactive chemicals £rom each other.
3. Sa£ety equipment and related considerations:
Requirements £or ventilation o£ cargo handling
spaces
Standards £or electrical equipment
Standards £or gauging o£ cargo tanks
Standards £or £ire protection
Standards £or personnel protection.
4. Special Requirements:
This chapter extends
parts, to recognize
properties o£ certain
extreme £lammability o£
5. Operating Requirements:
the Code's more general
the unusual hazards or
products, Ex: The
carbon disul£ide.
Contains various operating requirements
including maximum cargo tank capacities £or Type
I and II cargoes (Lakey, 1984).
A more thorough review o£ the Code's salient £eatures is
provided in Appendix II.
A notable e££ect o£ the Code was due to its
application to existing chemical tankers as well as new
tankers. This was not the normal procedure, as most
other IMO instruments did not apply to vessels already in
commerce. The Chemical Code was applied in a phased time
program requiring immediate compliance in certain
personnel protection areas, with up to six years £or
major ship modi£ications.
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HARPOL 73/78
The primary intent of the HARPOL Convention is to
control the discharge of polluting substances into the
sea, its approach is twofold; prevention of accidental
pollution, and control of operational discharges. Annex
II of HARPOL 73/78 deals with pollution by substances
other than oil, which includes chemicals. It ie under
Annex II that the Chemical Code is referenced, as the
minimum construction and equipment standard to prevent the
accidental discharge of chemical cargoes into the sea.
(The control of operational discharges is covered in the
next chapter; pollution and liability regulations.)
The significance of the Annex II reference to the
Chemical Code lies in the establishment of the precedent
process proved easier to legislate than to effect,
of a voluntary IHO code becoming international law. The
as it
would take fourteen years for the Annex II provisions to
come into force. The HARPOL 73 Convention established
1978 as the year the new regulations would be in effect.
However, difficulties experienced by flag states in
incorporating the Chemical Code into national regulations
made that milestone unachievable. By 1978, it appeared
the entire convention would be delayed entering into force
because of Annex II.
In 1978, a second HARPOL 73 convention was called to
consider the problem. The 1978 amendments allowed the
treaty and its annexes, other than Annex II,
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to become
effective by 1983. Annex II was delayed for three
after the treaty entered into force (Henry, 1985).
II ultimately entered into force in 1987.
SOLAS 1974
years
ANNEX
This was the first SOLAS convention after the
adoption of the IMDG and Chemical Codes. SOLAS 1974 was
called in response to the backlog of amendments to SOLAS
1960 that had built up awaiting ratification. The steady
increase in the membership of the IMO, meant
that a higher number of ratifications was required to
approve amendments, and by 1974, six such amendments
were on the books, but not ratified (Bole, 1984).
As in SOLAS 1960, Chapter VII was devoted to the
carriage of dangerous goods, and as originally ratified,
SOLAS 1974 was virtually identical in text and function to
the 1960 version (Bole, 1984). SOLAS 1974 was amended
first in 1978 and again in 1981 and 1983. The 1983
amendments would have a significant impact on the status
of both the IMDG and the Chemical Codes.
The 1983 amendments to SOLAS 1974 divide Chapter VII
into three parts. Part A deals with the carriage of
dangerous goods in packaged form or in solid bulk form.
The amendment includes a footnote reference to the IMDG
Code. Part B relates to the construction and equipment of
ships carrying dangerous liquid chemicals in bulk, and
ParL C covers construcLion and equipment of ships carrying
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liquified gases in bulk. Part B expressly incorporates
the Chemical Code; transforming a voluntary code,
into a mandatory requirement for party states
1985) .
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(Henry,
CHAPTER FIVE
THE REGULATORY REGIME:
POLLUTION AND LIABILITY
Background
Since the TORREY CANYON stranding o£ March 1967, an
international regime o£ law has developed to deal with
issues arising £rom the pollution o£ the sea. This regime
has £ocused on three general concepts, which have been
endorsed, not only by the maritime states, but by the
world community;
prevention.
Intervention
intervention, compensation, and
Intervention is the right o£ a coastal state to take
poeitive action to protect its coasts £rom pollution
cau~ed by a maritime accident. This was the £irst o£ a
series o£ ocean pollution issues addressed by the rMO
£ollowing the TORREY CANYON disaster, and was prompted by
the unprecedented actions o£ the United Kingdom
including bombing o£ the wreckage - taken in an attempt to
alleviate the pollution threat (McDorman and Gold, 1984).
It addresses the balance o£ traditional rights o£ mariners
on the high seas, with the rights o£ a coastal state to
protect its shoreline £rom ecological and economic
damage. The con£erence dealing with intervention met in
Bruesels in 1969, and produced The International Conven-
tion Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases o£
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Oil Pollution Casualties (The Intervention Convention)
which entered into £orce in June 1975.
Compensation
The issue o£ compensation £or pollution damages and
clean up costs compelled international attention £or the
£ollowing reasons:
1. The high cost o£ damages and clean up, which
could easily exceed the value o£ the ship and
cargo involved in the pollution incident.
2. The jurisdictional issue involved in claims by a
coastal state which has su££ered economic damage
£rom a vessel incident, which occured on the
high seas and involved ships and cargoes owned
and registered in states other than the a££ected
coastal state.
3. The prolonged time £rame, o£ten associated
between the occurence andwith maritime claims,
£inal award.
4. The issue o£ limitation o£ vessel owner liabil-
ity which maintains that unless the incident
occurred with the "actual £ault or privity" o£
the owner, the claims against the vessel are
limited to the value o£ the ship and cargo a£ter
the incident. (In the case o£ the TORREY CANYON
this amount was less than S50.00).
The high value o£ the damages su££ered by the United
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Kingdom £ollowing the TORREY CANYON incident called £or
international action to create a regime o£ compensation
£or such damages. The IHO sponsored convention which
adopted the Intervention Convention also produced the
International Convention on Civil Liability £or Oil
Pollution Damage (CLC) in 1969. The convention sets the
£ollowing precedent setting concepts:
1. It provides £or strict liability (subject to a
£ew, limited exceptions) on the registered owner;
2. It establishes a separate limitation amount
(McDorman
exclusively £or oil pollution damage which is
approximately double the existing international
standard £or vessel owner liability;
3. It requires registered owners to insure their
liability;
4. It insures that claims can be brought in states
where oil pollution damage is su££ered
and Gold, 1984).
The adoption o£ such a revolutionary instrument in
such a short period o£ time was due to the level o£ public
opinion arising £rom the TORREY CANYON incident, and
stands as a tribute to the e££ectiveness o£ the IHO
burden on the vessel carrying oil,
however,
(McDorman and Gold,
universally accepted,
1984). The instrument was not
as it placed an undue
a burden that even the
insurance industry expressed concern about their ability
to underwrite. Some states argued that the liability
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should be spread among other players in the petroleum
market in addition to the vessel owners. The arguments
were compelling inasmuchas the vessel owners were simply
one link in a market chain o£ producers to consumers; a
link that i£ made to bear the entire burden could break,
which would be to the decided disadvantage o£ all energy
consumers. The CLC convention ultimately passed with a
compromise that the nations would meet again to discuss
liability o£ the cargo interests, in the £orm o£ a Fund
o£ some kind (McDorman and Gold, 1984).
In 1971, the IMO sponsored the £ollow-on convention
which resulted in the International Convention on the
Establishment o£ an International Fund £or Compensation
£or Oil Pollution Damage (the Fund Convention) o£ 1971,
which entered into £orce in October 1978. The convention
established the International Oil Pollution Compensation
Fund (IOPC Fund) whose £unction is to reimburse those who
have su££ered oil pollution damage to the extent that they
have been unable to recover their loss under CLC. The
Fund has the e££ect o£ establishing a liability ceiling
£or the shipowner, which makes securing pollution
insurance easier £or the owner and much less risky £or the
insurer. The £und is supported by a levy on receipts £or
oil in party states, which e££ects a true sharing o£ the
burden o£ oil pollution between cargo interests and ship
interests.
Although the international compensation regime £or
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oil pollution did much to define and reduce risk, there
were at least two areas that le£t vessel owners and cargo
interests insecure: first, the regime did not provide
compensation £or expenses incurred in attempts to protect
against damages £rom an incident; and second, many
coastal states were not party to these conventions. From
the perspective o£ vessels and oil interests, they were
still liable £or unlimited claim in these respects. They
responded with industry sponsored compensation systems,
which mirror the international regime, but are based on
private funding; Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement on
Liability £or Oil Pollution (TAVALOP), and the Contract
Regarding an Interim Settlement of Tanker Liability for
Oil Pollution (CRISTAL). Both are £orms of sel£ insurance
clubs. The former is £or vessel owners, and handles
claims up to $70 million. The latter is £or cargo owners
and handles claims between $70 and $135 million. These
figures are most impressive when viewed in comparison to
the latest IOPC £und limit o£ $70 million, to be
e££ective 1 December 1987 <This Week, 1986).
The bottom line in oil pollution compensation is that
it is designed to support timely compensation £or damages
in an economically viable manner by sharing the risk among
vessel owners, cargo owners, and o£ course, consumers.
Consumers pay a higher price £or the product, and are
certainly the key element in the economic validity o£ the
system.
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Prevention
The international community turned its attention
toward pollution prevention in 1973. This time the
convention included the pollution of oceans by substances
other than oil. The International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships was adopted in 1973
(MARPOL 73) and came into force in October 1983. Its
approach to pollution prevention was more comprehensive
than earlier conventions centering around six major types
of pollution:
1. oil discharge from ships;
2. bulk, liquid or dry noxious substances other
than oil discharged from ships;
3. noxious substances carried in packages or con-
tainers;
4. shipboard sewage;
5. ship generated garbage;
6. control of pollution through improved design,
construction and equipment of tankers carrying
oil and ships transporting other noxious
substances in bulk (Mankabady, 1984).
Elements of this convention dealing with the Chemical
Code were addressed in the preceeding chapter; MARPOL
73/78 elevated the Chemical Code from a voluntary
instrument to international law for party states. A
detailed discussion on this convention's unique handling
of substances other than oil - including chemicals - is
contained in the next section.
International Pollution Law
for Substances Other Than Oil
Of the three main areas of international pollution
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legislation, prevention was the only area which considered
substances other than oil £rom its inception. Legisla-
tion £or the other two areas would be the subject o£
£ollow-on con£erences.
MARPOL 73/78
The primary intent o£ the MARPOL Convention was to
control the discharge o£ all polluting substances into the
sea. The approach is two£old; prevention o£ accidental
pollution and control o£ operational discharges. Most o£
the technical measures are contained in annexes to the
convention which are as £ollows:
Annex I
Annex II
Annex III
Annex IV
Annex V
Oil;
Noxious liquid substances carried in
bulk;
Harm£ul substances carried in pack-
ages (e.g., tanks and containers);
SeYJage;
Garbage.
Annexes III, IV, and V are optional, but governments
rati£ying the convention must accept Annexes I and II
(Mankabady, 1984).
Annex II contains detailed requirements £or discharge
criteria, and measures £or the control o£ pollution by
liquid noxious substances carried in bulk. It applies to
all tankers greater than 150 gross tons. The Annex
divides substances into £our categories, graded A to D,
according to the hazard they present to marine resources,
human health or amenities. Some 250 common cargoes are
listed in these categories,
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and residue speci£ications
provided
sea. In
category
must be met prior to overboard discharge to the
essence, the law restricts the pumping o£
A products and certain category Band C products
(those with high melting point and high viscosity charac-
teristics) to diluted amounts totaling less than 1/30,000
o£ the amount o£ that cargo carried. Discharge o£ any re-
sidue is £orbidden within 12 nm o£ land, or in water less
than 25 meters (approx 82 £t) deep (Schultz, 1986).
The ability to meet these discharge requirements is a
£unction o£ tank size and pump capability. All pumps will
lose suction with some ·minimal level o£ product le£t in
the tank. I£ the total amount o£ standing cargo, and the
residue le£t on tank sur£aces exceeds 1/30,000 o£ the
total tank cargo capacity, then the residue cannot be
pumped into the sea. The alternative £or overboard
discharge is to pump the residue to terminals ashore,
which raises a host o£ complex disposal problems.
Parties to the convention are obliged to provide
adequate £acilities £or the reception o£ residues at oil
loading terminals. However, the convention does not
address who pays £or the disposal o£ these residues. Dis-
posal is expensive; £rom the shipowners perspective the
cargo owner should pay, the cargo owner £eels that it is
the shipowners problem and the terminal operator is in the
middle. All are understandably reticent to accept
responsibility £or residues which are a considerable dis-
posal problem. The economies o£ residue disposal are
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complex~ and di££er £rom country to country. A scenario
in which a parcel tanker sails £rom port to port amassing
an assemblage o£ worthless residues which are expensive to
dispose of~ take precious import time to pump~ and rob
the vessel o£ revenue producing tonnage~ excited a high
level o£ concern among shipowners.
just prior to the shipping recession o£
law~ combined with the adoption o£ the
In 1973~
1975-79~ this
Chemical Code~ spelled extinction £or the older~ less
e££iciently designed chemical tankers. Within years~
however~ the economic £easibility o£ achieving the con-
ventions goals appeared harder and harder. This was the
principle reason £or the MARPOL Convention o£ 1978 which
considered amendments to MARPOL 73. Although the
convention resulted in changes in the approach to Annex I~
Annex II was de£erred until three years a£ter Annex I
entered into £orce (Mankabady~ 1984). The delay in
execution o£ Annex II provided states an opportunity to
address the disposal responsibility issue.
The ultimate solution to the residue disposal problem
was to avoid the collection o£ residues. If a vessel
cannot meet the residue dilution requirements £or category
A and some category Band C products~ it is simply
barred £rom carrying those products (Schultz~ 1986). In
this way~ theoretically~ no residues will be required to
be pumped ashore in the normal course o£ ship operations.
All cargoes carried on parcel tankers can be flushed and
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dumped outside 12 nm and in water greater than 25 meters.
Intervention on the High Seas
in Cases o£ Pollution
by Substances Other Than Oil (1973)
The Intervention Convention £or substances other than
oil addresses the issues o£ maritime states rights verses
coastal states rights. It handles the legal issues in
precisely the same way as the Intervention Convention £or
Oil Pollution, and was enacted in 1973 without major
problem <McDorman and Gold, 1984).
into £orce on 30 March 1983.
The convention entered
International Regulation o£ Civil Liability and
Compensation £or Damages Arising £rom Maritime
Transportation o£ Hazardous and Noxious Substances
Other Than Oil <HNS Convention)
The HNS Convention is a proposed attempt to deal with
the compensation issues o£ pollution by substances other
than oil. Since its introduction in 1969 delegates have
met several times, most recently in 1984, but have not
yet agreed on a treaty. The goal o£ HNS is identical to
the CLC and the Fund conventions; to provide an
expeditious cure £or damages caused by hazardous substance
pollution, based on an economical sharing o£ the risk
among more than one participant. The problems
experienced translating the oil pollution regime into HNS
are principally two£old <DeBievre, 1986).
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Shipper Liability
HNS liability is intrinsically di££erent than
pollution liability. HNS includes environmental damages
and economic consequences, but it also entails new risks
outside the con£ines o£ the ship. These include: serious
damage £rom £ire, explosion, and toxicity which can lead
to bodily injury and death claims; as well as
carcinogenic claims that may not sur£ace £or years a£ter
the event. The convention reached basic tenants rather
easily, including the concept o£ strict liability, but
experienced di££iculty in how to apportion the liability.
The £ollowing proposals have been considered so £ar:
I -
II -
III -
IV -
V -
Joint liability o£ shipper and shipowner;
Two tier system; primary to shipowner and re-
sidual to shipper;
Exclusive liability o£ shipowner;
Exclusive liability o£ cargo producer;
Exclusive liability o£ cargo producer under
product liability <DeBievre, 1986).
In 1984, it was clear that some sort o£ shippers
liability was deemed appropriate. It was intended to take
account o£ the £act that the damages £rom these cargoes
result not only £rom ships misconduct, but also £rom the
cargo carried <DeBievre, 1986). The di££iculties involved
in the detailing o£ shippers liability, were to be
considerable. For example; £rom a vessel that may carry
40 di££erent cargoes, owned by 40 di££erent individuals,
how do we identi£y whose cargo did the damage?
It was indeed the perceived practical di££iculty
of identifying satis£actorily the shipper £or the
purpose o£ civil liability •.. which appeared to
seriously hamper progress on the £inalization o£
the dra£t o£ the HNS Convention (DeBievre, 1986).
By the close o£ the convention most delegates were in
£avor o£ ftlternative II, with a compulsory cargo
insurance scheme or £und available £or the higher tier o£
coverage. Had other problems not developed with HNS,
this was the scheme that most probably would have emerged.
Types o£ Hazardous Cargoes
In one sense the di££iculties in describing what
cargoes are hazardous are related to the shippers
liability issue. The IMO legal committee had £avored
including only cargoes carried in bulk, excluding those
in packaged £orm. This was based on the liability
requirements to be levied on the shipper, and the
problems anticipated to be experienced in attempting to
identi£y all o£ the shippers o£ packaged and containerized
goods. The inclusion o£ only bulk products would
considerably limit the number o£ cargoes, and in that way
£acilitate the identi£ication process. This proposal was
met with strong dis£avor by the convention delegates £or
the £ollowing two reasons:
1. Some products carried only in packaged £orm are
actually a greater potential danger than most
bulk products; and
2. It would place the liability burden on shippers
who utilize bulk shipments, which would act as
a disincentive £or bulk shipment methods.
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This
was undesirable £or most delegates considered
bulk shipment sa£er than packaged or container
shipment.
Another issue which caused di££iculty was that
experience has indicated that recently emptied petroleum
cargo tanks contained, statistically, the most hazardous
cargo o£ all - petroleum vapors. In attempting to deal
with an example like petroleum vapors, the whole concept
o£ shippers liability becomes very £uzzy. How do we hold
a shipper liable when his cargo has been discharged and
receipted £or (DeBeivre, 1986)1
The HNS Convention was clearly not ready to address
these issues to the satis£action o£ the majority o£
delegates. It can be envisioned, however, that
eventually the £inal dra£t will include bulk and packaged/
containerized cargo; and will levy a £ee on such
shipments to support a general liability £und similar to
the ropc Fund. One thing is certain, the shipowner will
continue to carry his share o£ the liability burden £or
the transportation o£ hazardous goods at sea.
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CHAPTER SIX
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
This study has endeavored to present a comprehensive
treatment o£ the development o£ the ocean chemical
transportation industry. The approach was intended to
aquaint the reader with the technology, the management,
and the regulatory regime which has evolved since the
emergence o£ the chemical industry. This chapter dis-
cusses selected cases o£ hazardous cargo incidents that
have occured, and identi£ies the technological,
managerial, or regulatory responses that have evolved to
reduce the risk o£ reoccurance.
Selected Incident Analysis
With the exception o£ accidents involving oil tankers
there have been comparatively £ew major incidents at sea
incidents that have occured,
involving chemical cargoes. However,
resulted
some o£ the
in the worst
disasters in shipping history (Inglis, 1984).
The cas~s that £ollow are considered representative
examples o£ the risks involved in the ocean transportation
o£ chemicals. The accompanying discussion provides
re£erence to the risk management technique, i£ one
exists, designed to preclude reoccurance.
SS GRANDCAMP
The break bulk £reighter S5 GRANDCAMP caught £ire and
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exploded while loading a cargo of ammonium nitrates
fertilizer in Texas City, Texas in April 1947. The
explosion was of such force that it destroyed two light
planes flying overhead and engulfed the SS HIGH FLYER
also loading ammonium nitrates fertilizer, at a berth 200
yarde away. The SS HIGH FLYER subsequently burned and
exploded. 468 lives were lost, mostly as a result of the
first explosion.
The proximate cause of the explosion was a fire that
broke out in one of the ships cargo holds. The subsequent
investigation revealed that the crew and longshormen were
unaware of the hazardous nature of ammonium nitrates and
used improper, as well as ineffective firefighting
techniquee. The subetantial loes of life and property
damage could have been avoided if the nature of the hazard
had been realized. Ammonium nitrates were utilized
extensively in the production of exploeivee during World
agricultural fertilizer.
War II. Following the war, this product wae sold as an
The cargo loaded onboard the
GRANDCAMP was labeled "fertilizer compound," to take
advantage of lower freight rates for fertilizer than for
ammonium nitrates (Inglis, 1984).
The GRANDCAMP incident must have been a strong
motivating factor behind the strengthened treatment of
hazardous cargo classification and labeling by SOLAS 1948.
Had this cargo been properly identified, and therefore
recognized as hazardous, the response to the fire onboard
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the GRANDCAMP would have been quite di££erent.
A similar incident involving a £ire onboard the SS
OCEAN LIBERTY, also loaded with ammonium nitrates
£ertilizer, occured in Brest, France during the summer
o£ 1947. The local authorities had learned enough £rom
the GRANDCAMP incident to tow the vessel out to sea where
she then exploded with the loss o£ 21 lives. Shipboard
£ire£ighting e££orts were severely hampered by toxic £umes
and lack o£ knowledge.
These incidents illustrated two distinct aspects o£
the hazardous carrgo problem; identi£ication and
response, both o£ which were acknowledged by the SOLAS
1948 Convention and ultimately addressed by SOLAS 1960 and
the IMDG Code. Had these documents been available in
1947, the cargoes would have been identi£ied as
hazardous, marked accordingly, and the crews would have
had in£ormation available as to the toxic hazard and the
most e££icient £ire£ighting techniques.
SS MARINE SULFUR QUEEN
The SS MARINE SULFUR QUEEN disappeared in February
1963 while enro\lte £rom Beaumont, Texas to Nor£olk, Vir-
ginia with a cargo o£ molten sul£ur. The only trace o£
the vessel recovered were li£e preservers stenciled with
the vessels name. Thirty-nine lives were lost.
Although the cause o£ the disaster was never
determined, there was considerable speculation that
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linked the disappearance to the hazardous nature o£ the
cargo. One New York Times report included a quote by a
U.S. Coast Guard o££icer that i£ the sul£ur had come into
contact with water, the "ship would go up like an atom
bomb" (Search £or Tanker is Expanded in Vain, 1963).
Subsequent to the disappearance, a cooperative study
was conducted by the Department o£ the Interior, the
Bureau o£ Mines, and the Texas Gul£ Sul£ur Company (the
owners o£ the SS MARINE SULFUR OUEEN's cargo). The
resulting report quelled the water/sul£ur reaction
theory, and determined that an explosive risk existed
through the £ormation o£ hydrogen sul£ide and carbon
disul£ide gases in an enclosed space above the molten
sul£ur. The report recommended ventilation o£ molten
sul£ur tanks to avoid the build up o£ explosive gases
(United States Department o£ the Interior, Bureau
o£ Mines, 1963). Since the MARINE SULFUR OUEEN was
equipped with tank ventilation systems, the report did
not provide a reasonable explanation £or the apparent
suddeness o£ her loss. Even i£ the ventilation systems
had mal£unctioned, the gaseous explosions would have
resulted in a molten sul£ur £ire,
destruction that was hypothesized.
not the instantaneous
The special USCG Board
o£ Inquiry could make no £inal conclusions as to the cause
o£ the loss o£ the SS MARINE SULFUR OUEEN (Board Can't
Explain Sul£ur Shipe Loss, 1963).
The studies that £ollowed the loss o£ the MARINE
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SULFUR QUEEN provide reliable data which was utilized by
both industry and shipping management to enhance
transportation safety of molten sulfur cargoes. Since
1963, molten sulfur has been transported by a relatively
small fleet of industrial carriers ~ 11 ships jn 1963,
8 ships in 1987 - without a major cargo related accident.
As for molten sulfur's reactivety with water; the USCG
Chemical Data Guide for Bulk Shipments by Water of 1982
states,"A major spill of liquid sulfur into navigable
waters will solidify and sink, presenting no unusual
hazard".
SS V.A. FOGG
The SS V.A. FOGG exploded and sank while enroute from
Freeport, Texas to Houston on 1 February 1972. She
carried three tanks of xylene,
tanks of benzene in Freeport.
having just offloaded 22
The benzene tanks were
scheduled for cleaning during her transit to Houston.
Thirty-nine lives were lost.
The vessels wreckage was located on February 11,
based on positions reported by pilot sightings of a dark
mushroom shaped cloud on February 1st. Examination of the
wreckage revealed that her cargo section was almost
totally destroyed by explosions, while her engine order
telegraph still indicated Full Ahead. The cause of the
explosion has been determined, with some degree of
confidence, to have been ignition of benzene vapors by an
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electrostatic charge, probably emanating from an
ungrounded stripping pump lowered into a cargo tank. Such
a pump was found in the bottom of nr2 wing tank on board
the V.A. FOGG (Williams, 1973).
The casualty to the V.A. FOGG was due to the
violation of a well recognized and proven procedure for
tank cleaning following offload of extremely flammable
liquids. It is somewhat comforting to know that the V.A.
FOGG would not be certified to carry such a product today.
The industry response to tank cleaning hazards has been
largely technological.
structural
Improved tank design,
framework outside of the tank,
placing the
dramatically
reduces the amount of product residue remaining after
Use of stainless steel and improved coatingoffload.
systems make installed tank washing systems more
effective, and have all but eliminated the need for tank
entry between cargoes. Additionally, installed tank
forced ventilation systems have proven most effective at
removing all residue vapors, toxic and explosive (Symon,
1981) .
Both industry management and the IMO recognize that
technological solutions cannot substitute for crew
training. Chapter V of the Chemical Code provides
standards for crew training for various levels of super-
vision of board chemical ships. Required training
includes fundamentals in ship/tanker knowledge,
emergency proceedures, specialized cargo handling,
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and
cargo characteristics.
55 MONT LAURIER
The French container vessel 55 MONT LAURIER caught
£ire and was ultimately abandoned in the Atlantic, six
lives were lost. The tragedy occured in heavy seas when
several plastic drums o£ Fixapret chemical resin popped
their lids and leaked onto the trailer deck. The strong
£umes and odors emanating £rom the chemical made clean up
impossible. As the seas intensi£ied, more drums o£ the
resin broke loose and leaked, eventually covering the
trailer deck and over£lowing into adjacent spaces
including the engine room. By evening o£ the second day,
the cargo on the trailer deck shi£ted causing a 15 degree
port list. A series o£ explosions occured on the trailer
deck overnight and the ship was abandoned the £ollowing
morning (Inglis, 1984).
This case is an example o£ inadequate noti£ication,
packaging, and stowage. It is unclear £rom available
accounts i£ the crew was aware o£ the hazard, but they
were not prepared to deal with the situation once the
would have at least provided
chemical
£ollowed
was spilled.
in this case,
The IMDG Code, had it been
the
crew with some warning as to the nature o£ the product,
and sa£ety precautions £or clean up. It also appears that
the packaging, in plastic drums, was inadequate
containment £or ocean transportation where ships movement
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will predictably cause agitation and plastic drum
compression.
SS ASIA FREIGHTER
This U.S.-flag container ship was abandoned in the
Atlantic in November of 1974, following an outbreak of
illness efffecting the entire crew. Eventually the source
of the illness was determined to be a loose cylinder of
arsine gas <arsenic and hydrogen, AsH 3 > within one of the
containers. No markings, notification or warnings had
been suplied to the crew. Arsine is a colorless, flamm-
able, extremely poisonous gas.
If the IMDG Code had been followed in this case, the
arsine gas would have been identified as a poisonous gas
<class 2.3>, and the container would have been
accompanied by a packaging certificate describing the
bracing of the arsine cylinder.
The preceding two cases highlight one area of
weakness with the present regulatory regime, particularly
when intermodal container or roll-on roll-off cargo is
involved. The vessel owner is dependent on the cargo
owner for the proper packaging and stowage of the cargo
container.
The IMO and the International Labor Organization
<ILO) have produced guidelines for training in the
packaging of cargo in freight containers, but the
incentive remains strong for dockside inspection of the
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contents o£ containers by experienced and quali£ied
stevedors/boatswains. This is impractical £or all
containers, but possible £or selected containers, £or
example; those containing hazardous cargoes.
I£ the vessel owner can be assured that all hazardous
cargoes have been identi£ied, his task o£ inspection and
loading is made easier. The prudent master or owner
should consider the properties o£ hazardous cargo while
developing the ships loading plan to minimize the hazards
to the vessel and crew, and to £acilitate jettisoning.
SS PUERTO RICAN
The SS PUERTO RICAN, a U.S.-£lag parcel tanker, ex-
ploded and burned in October 1984, just outside the
harbor o£ San Francisco Cali£ornia, with one li£e lost.
The actual cause o£ the casuelty cannot be established
with certainty. The probable cause was leaking caustic
soda cargo, which reacted with zinc chromate preservative
to £orm hydrogen gas in a void space. This gas was
possibly ignited by an electrostatic charge which led to a
series o£ cargo £ires and explosions <U.S. Coast Guard,
Marine Casualty Report Tankship PUERTO RICAN, 1985).
The initial explosion destroyed the installed main
deck £ire £ighting system, which delayed e££ective £ire
£ighting response. Structural damage £rom the series o£
explosions was su££icient to cause the vessel to break in
two when attempts were made to tow her away £rom land.
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The stern section sank, the remaining section was
recovered and ultimately scrapped. This event resulted in
considerable environmental damage, the loss o£ li£e was
minimized due to the rapid assistance which was provided
by harbor vessels and the U.S. Coast Guard. 1£ this
the loss o£ li£eincident had occured on the high seas,
may have been much greater.
This casualty is most sombering because it occured
onboard a well managed and technologically capable vessel,
that was fUlly certified by both USCG and IMO standards.
The leak, whJch allowed the uncontrolled flooding of 2500
barrels of caustic soda into the void space, was traced
to a one inch square gouge in the stainless steel cladding
in a cargo tank. The gouge probably existed since the
vessel was built in 1971. Successive cargoes of corrosive
materials had eaten away the mild steel plate that backed
the stainless cladding. The imperfection was hidden in
the shadow of a ventilation system pipe bracket, and
until shortly before this accident would probably have
passed an air test.
The ships crew noted the apparant loss of caustic
soda from the cargo tank prior to sailing from San
Francisco, however, a physical inspection of the tank
revealed no apparent problem, so the loss was written off
as an ullage reading error. No soundings were taken or
inspections conducted in the adjacent void because the
the crew mistakenly thought the void was under an inerting
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blanket of nitrogen.
This incident, more than the others presented, is
disturbing because it emphasizes the potential impact of
human error on the regulatory and
onboard a technically capable vessel.
Conclusions
managerial regime
This study has endeavered to provide a review of the
technology, management and regulatory regime which
controls the risks involved in the carriage of chemicals,
many of which are hazardous, on the high seas. Many of
the concepts, procedures and techniques presented in this
paper are applicable to all hazardous cargoes transported
either as packaged or bulk commodities. The selected
incidents presented in the preceeding section provide the
actual industry experiences on which the present risk
management system is based, and highlight areas of
defficiency for which future system improvements mayor
may not be forthcoming.
The £ollowing conclusions are o££ered which support a
high level o£ con£idence in the risk management system for
the ocean transportation o£ chemicals:
1 . The ocean transportation o£ chemicals is a
highly competitive and pro£essional business,
which relies on concerned and capable management
hazardous chemicals. To a great extent,
to assure saxe and sanitary
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handling o£
the
2.
industriee competitive base enhances the
o£ ea£ety and e££icient handling.
The chemical transportation industry
goale
is
technically capable o£ transporting dangerous
cargoes with minimal risk within the limitations
de£ined by competent regulatory agencies.
3. The chemical transportation industry is well
regulated at both the national and international
level; with an increasing degree o£
international
areas:
compatibility in the £ollowing
a) identi£ication, labeling and stowage
b) ship construction standards
both accidental andc)
4.
pollution control,
operational.
The ocean transportation o£ chemicals is not
risk £ree; the inherent properties o£ the cargo
do not allow £or human error without risk o£
pollution damage, bodily injury and death to
those operating the vessel, and to the vicinity
in which the vessel is operating and its
inhabitants.
Based on these conclusions it is recommended that the
IMO pursue the creation o£ an international liability
regime, such as the proposed HNS Convention, to assure
expeditious cure to injured parties and recovery £or
damages. Further, the instrument should apply to all
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£orms o£ hazardous cargo both packaged and bulk. Some
£orm o£ cargo owner liability should be considered,
particularly £or packaged or containerized cargoes where
the shipowner has no reaonable means o£ assuring seaworthy
packaging and stowage.
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NOTES
1. Ensuing discussion based on "The Versitile MARINE
DOW-CHEW' . Where other sources were utilized,
appropriate references are provided.
2. It is interesting to note that in 1961 Dow and MTL
teamed up again to build the second purpose built
carrier, the SS LELAND I. DOAN. Although virtually
identical to her predecessor, the use of cylindrical
rubber coated tanks was dropped in favor of
rectangular steel tanks with applied liquid coating
systems for hydrochloric acid contamination.
3. Dual rate schemes, a classic conference device also
called a deferred rebate; a payment made
retroactively for the faithful use of conference
vessels over a specified prior period.
Fighting committees, a conference committee
empowered to select "fighting ship" vessels from any
of the conference liners, to sail on the same day
and between the same ports as had been scheduled by
an independent carrier at rates reduced sufficiently
to secure the traffic.
4. For purposes of simplicity the title IMO will be
utilized exclusively in this paper, wjth the
understanding that prior to 1982 the title was
actually IMCO.
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NOTES
5. Ullage, A measure of a product in a container,
based on the distance from the surface of the product
to the top of the container.
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Source:
APPENDIX I
THE IMDG CODE
Dr D.B. Inglis, "The International Maritime
Dangerous Goods Code", The International
Maritime Organization, Samir Mankabady, Ed.
Croom Helm, London and Sydney. 1984.
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The I1'1DG Code
In response to this recommendation, 11'10 formed a
special Working Group made up of countries which had
considerable experience in the carriage of dangerous
goods. Preliminary drafts for each class were
compiled by individual national delegations and then
considered by the Working Group, taking into account
the practices and procedures of a number of maritime
countries in order to 'make the Code as widely
acceptable as possible.
The resulting document was called the Internat-
ional Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code and,
after being approved by the Maritime Safety Commi-
ttee, was adopted by the IMO Assembly in 1965.
The Code is designed to aid compliance with the
requirements of Chapter VII of the SOLAS Convention,
and to complement and supplement them. It was
developed in close consultation with the UN Commi-
ttee of Experts and took into account the recommend-
ations prepared by them .
Although it is designed primarily for mariners,
its prOVisions may affect industries and services
from manufacturer to consumer. Manufacturers,
packers and shippers should be gUided by the advice
given for terminology, packing and labelling.
Feeder services, such as road, rail and harbour
craft may also need to adopt, or at least to recog-
nise, the prOVisions in respect of labelling and
classification. Port authorities may use the Code
to effect suitable segregation within loading, dis-
charge and storage areas. Although the Code only
applies to the ships covered by the SOLAS Convention,
IMO considers that it is highly desirable that its
reqUirements should be extended to other ships as
well.
Since its introduction in 1965, the IMDG Code
has undergone many changes, both in appearance and
in content. By the middle of 1982, no fewer than 20
sets of amendments had been adopted(l). This
process can be carried out relatively easily, since
in 1965 the Assembly agreed that amendments "which
do not affect the principles upon which the Code is
based" could be adopted by the Maritime Safety
Committee (MSC) alone.
The latest version of the Code is pUblished in
five loose-leaf volumes (in the English edition) so
that amendments can be easily inserted. The Code is
also published in French and a new Spanish edition
will be produced shortly.
The first part of the Code consists of a gen-
eral introduction. Chapter VII of the 1974 SOLAS
Convention and Resolution 56 of the 1960 SOLAS Con-
ference are both re-printed, followed by the class-
ification of dangerous goods used in the Code and a
description of standardisation of methods for est-
ablishing the flashpoint of substances (the flash-
point is the lowest temperature of a liquid at which
its vapour forms an ignitable mixture with air and
consequently gives a measure of the risk of format-
ion of explosive or ignitable mixtures when the
liqUid or its vapour escapes from its packaging) .
The introduction goes on to describe methods of
marking, identification, labelling and placarding,
documentation and packing.
, . .
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AlsO in the 1ntrodUct10n are SeCt10ns COnta1n-
ing special requirements for freight containers and
portable tanks and road tank vehicles; stowage and
segregation; fire prevention and fire fighting. The
final sections deal with the carriage of dangerous
goods On roll-on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) ships; in limited
quantities; and in shipborne barges on barge-carry-
ing ships.
Annex I to the general introduction gives
packaging recommendations and a glossary of packag-
ings, with illustrations.
Following the general introduction, the Code
then consists of a complete list of dangerous goods
divided into nine classes. The classes are:
Class I - Explosives
Class 2 - Gases: compressed, liquefied or
dissolved under pressure
Class 3 - Inflammable(~) liquids
Class 4 - Inflammable solids, substances liable
to spontaneous combustion and sub-
stances emitting inflammable gases
when wet
Class 5 - Oxidising substances and organic
peroxides
Class 6 - Poisonous (toxic) and infectious
substances
Class 7 - Radioactive substances
Class 8 - Corrosives
Class 9 - Miscellaneous dangerous substances
Each class is preceded by an introduction which
describes the properties and definitions of the
goods and gives details of stowage and segregation
(i.e. the degree to which goods should be kept sep-
arate from other dangerous substances carried on a
ship). The class introduction also gives inform-
ation concerning procedure which should be followed
during loading and unloading.
Each class is identified by a distinctive
label - some of which will be familiar to road users
since they often appear on commercial vehicles which
carry dangerous goods, such as petrol tank vehicles.
Where appropriate, each schedule in the Code shows
the label which should be affixed to a package.
Individual schedules in the Code follow a sim-
ilar pattern. The substance's proper shipping name
or correct technical name appears at the top left
of the page. To the right of this, other vital
information will be given, such as the serial
number assigned to the substance by the United
Nations Committee of Experts (its UN number); its
chemical formula; explosive and flashpoint limits;
and so on.
Other headings used in the Code include prop-
erties (such as its appearance); special observat-
ions; packing, and stowage. The schedule also shows
the label or labels appropriate to the substance.
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Class 1 - Explosives
Thes~ are among the most dangerous of all goods
carr led by sea and the precautions outlined in this
class of the Co?e a~e"part~cularly stringent.
The Class lS dlvlded lnto five divisions which
present different hazards. The divisions are as
follows:
Division 1.1 Substances and articles which
have a mass explosion hazard.
Division 1.2 Substances and articles which
have a projection hazard but not
a mass explosion hazard.
Division 1.3 Substances and articles which
have a fire hazard and either a
minor blast hazard or both, but
not a mass explosion hazard.
Division 1.4 Substances and articles which
present no significant hazard.
Division 1.5 Very insensitive substances which
have a mass explosion hazard: the
substances in this division are
so Lris eris i ti ve tha t the re is ve ry
little probability of initiation
or of transition from burning to
detonation under normal condit-
ions of transport.
Class 1 is unique in that the type of packaging
has a decisive effect on the hazard and therefore on
the assignment of the particular division.
Goods in this class are also assigned to
various Stowage Categories. Stowage Category I
(Ordinary) covers goods which present relatively
little hazard. Category II involves the provision
of a magazine for stowage of such goods, and is
itself divided into three groups. Stowage Category
III is for pyrotechnics and Category IV for special
items, mainly goods which contain both explosive and
chemical agents which can evolve tear-producing or
toxic gases.
Although the safety of goods in Class I can
best be assured by stowing them separately, in
practice this can rarely be done. To ensure that
they are stowed as safely as possible, the sub-
stances in the class are arranged in twelve compat-
ibility groups. These are lettered from A to L (the
I is missing) and the letter S.
The compatibility groups and classification
codes are shown below:
Description of substance or Compat- Class-
article to be classified ibili ty ification
Group Code
Primary explosive substance A 1.1 A
Article containing a primary B 1.1 B
explosive substance and not con- 1.2 B
taining two or more independent 1.4 B
safety features
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1.1 F
1. 2 F
1. 3 F
1.4 F
1.1 E
1. 2 E
1. 4 E
D
F
E
Propellant explosive substance
or other deflagrating explosive
substance or article containing
such explosive substance
Secondary detonating explosive
substance or black powder or
article containing a secondary
detonating explosive substance,
in each case without means of
initiation and witho~t a
propelling charge. Articles
containing a primary explosive
substance and containing two or
more independent safety features
Article containing a secondary
detonating explosive substance,
without means of initiation,
with a propelling charge (other
than one containing an inflamm-
able or hypergolic liquid)
Article containing a secondary
detonating explosive with its
own means of initiation, with
a propelling charge (other than
one containing an inflammable or
hypergolic liquid) or without a
propelling charge
j De s c r i p t i o n of substance or iCompat- Class-
/
i a r t i c l e to be classified ~'b 'l ' 'f '1 lty 1 lcation
1>------,,..--------------1· - ,- ,f~d~ _
C 1.1 C
1. 2 C
1. 3 C
1. 4 C
1.1 D
1. 2 D
1. 4 D
1.5 D
pyrotechnic substance, or
article containing a pyro-
technic substance, or article
containing both an explosive
substance and an illuminating,
incendiary, lachrymatory or
smoke-producing substance
(other than a water-activated
article or one containing white
phosphorus, phosphide or an
inflammable liquid or gel)
G 1.1 G
1. 2 G
1. 3 G
1. 4 G
Article containing both an
explosive substance and white
phosphorus
Article containing both an
explosive substance and an
inflammable liquid or gel
Article containing both an
explosive substance and a toxic
chemical agent
Explosive substance or article
containing an explosive
substance and presenting a
special risk needing isolation
of each type
H 1.2 H
1.3 H
J 1.1 J
1.2 J
1.3 J
K 1.2 K
1.3 K
L 1.1 L
1.2 L
1.3 L
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Description of substance or
article to be classified
Substance or article so packed
or designed that any hazardous
effects arising from accidental
functioning are confined within
the package unless the package
has been degraded by fire, in
which case all blast or pro-
jection effects are limited to
the extent that they do not
significantly hinder or prohibit
fire fighting or other emergency
response efforts in the immed-
iate vicinity of the package
Compat- Class-
ibility ification
Code
I
5 1.4 5
NOTES: 1. The descriptions are intended to be
mutually exclusive except for a substance
or article which qualifies for Compatibil-
ity Group S. Since the criterion of
Compatibility Group S is an empirical one,
assignment to this group is necessarily
linked to the tests for assignment to
Division 1.4.
2. Articles in Compatibility Group D or E may
be pac ked together with means of initiat-
ion provided that the hazard of causing an
explosion of the article is virtually
eliminated in the event of accidental
operation of the means of initiation.
3. Articles in compatibility Group D or E may
be fitted with their means of initiation
provided that the means has a safety
device to interrupt the initiation in the
event of accidental operation.
In addition to the name and UN number the in-
dividual schedules in Class 1 also give the sub-
stance's or article's division and compatibility
group. This information must also be shown on the
label which goes on the package. The schedule also
shows the substance's or article's stowage category.
Class 2 - Gases
Gases carried on board ships have very varied prop-
erties and come in different forms. They may be
compressed liquefied a~ ambient temperature under
high pressures: dissolved under pressure in a
solvent, which is then absorbed in a porous mater-
ial: or liquefied by refrigeration. They may be for
example poisonous, corrosive, inflammable, support-
ers of combustion (oxygen), or a combination of all
or some of these. Some are 'muc h lighter than air
(hydrogen) while others are much heavier (carbon
dioxide). Lighter gases will tend to disperse more
quickly should a leak occur, while the heavier gases
will tend to accumulate close to the ground.
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The Code gives general information concerning
the properties of gases, packing, stowage, segregat-
ion and fire precautions.
The schedules include the UN number, the chem-
ical formula, and for inflammable gases, their
explosive limits. The latter refers to the amount
of gas required to make a quantity of air explosive.
The wider the explosive limit range, the more
hazardous the gas, as there is the possibility of an
explosion over a large range of concentrations. An
example of such a gas is acetylene whose lower
explosive limit (LEL) is 2 .1\ and upper explosive
limit (UEL) is 80\. This means that a mixture of
acetylene in air can become explosive when quite
dilute up to high concentrations.
The schedule goes on to describe the gas's
properties, any special observations, and details of
packing and stowage.
There are three sub-classes: inflammable gas
(2.1), non-flammable compressed gas (2.2), and
poisonous gas (2.3).
Class 3 - Inflan~able liquids
This class deals with liquids weich gi~e off an in-
flammable vapour at or below 61 C (141 F); some
liquids may be included in other classes because of
other dangerous characteristics.
The class is divided into three sub-classes
according to flashpoint. Class 3.1 consis6s ofliquids with a low flashpoint of below -18 C (OoF);
class 3.2 consists of liquids with an intermedbate
flaOhpOint of -laoC up to but not including 23 C
(73 F)i and class 3.3 consists of liquids with a
high flashpoint of 230C and above up to 6loC (141 oF).
The Code refers to the various methods which
can be used to establish the flashpoint of liquids.
Liquids with low flashpoints are more hazardous than
those with higher ones, and thus the requirements
for low flashpoint liquids are more stringent.
The introduction to the class includes inform-
ation on packing, stowage, segregation and fire
precautions.
Individual schedules are arranged in the three
sub-classes referred to above starting with class
3.1. The schedule includes the substance's name,
UN number, chemical formula, explosive limits and
flashpoint.
Other information comes under similar headings
to those which appear in other classes of the Code,
i.e. properties, (special) observations, packing and
stowage.
Substances in this group are also assigned to a
packaging group which is determined by the degree of
danger presented. Packing Group I includes liquids
presenting great danger, Group II medium danger and
Group III minor danger. A similar system of assign-
ing goods to one of three packaging groups is used
in other classes of the Code, with the exception of
Classes 1, 2 and 7.
Generally speaking, water is unsuitable for
fighting inflammable liquid fires. The Code rec-
ommends either the use of water as a fine spray, or
the use of foam which forms a scum on the burning
liquid surface making the access of oxygen diff-
icult .
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Class 5 - OXidising agents
- Organic peroxides
The class is divided into two sub-classes. Class
5.1 deals with OXidising substances which, although
not necessarily combustible themselves, have the
potential to increase the intensity of a fire by
giving off oxygen (a supporter of combustion) which
is present in the structure of all oxidising agents.
Therefore, the use of fire extinguishers which act
by excluding oxygen from the fire, will not· work
with these materials. Class 5.2 includes organic
peroxides, most of which are combustible.
Class 5.1: Oxidising agents
The fact that all substances in this class give off
oxygen when involved in a fire creates obvious
fire-fighting difficulties. Some substances may
also be sensitive to impact, friction or a rise in
temperature. Others may react Vigorously with
moisture, increasing the risk of fire.
OXidising substances should be kept away from
combustible materials, e.g. spilt oil, oily rags,
sawdust, which may catch fire and burn explosively.
The use of sawdust on ships for absorbing spillages
must not be used for Class 5 substances and, in
fact, it is better replaced with an inert absorbent
such as vermiculite.
Most oxidising substances react Vigorously and
sometimes explosively, with strong mineral acids.
For example, sodium chlorate reacts violently with
sulphuric acid giving off a toxic gas.
Since the use of a fire extinguisher such as
carbon dioxide may be ineffective with odixising
materials because they give off oxygen, the Code
recommends the prompt use of large quantities of
water as being the best means of controlling this
type of fire.
This class includes ammonium nitrate fertiliz-
ers, hydrogen peroxide, copper chlorate and lead
nitrate.
Class 5.2: Organic peroxides
In addition to being OXidising agents, most sub-
stances in this class are also liable to explosive
decomposition. Most will burn rapidly and are
sensitive to heat. Some are also sensitive to
impact or friction. To reduce this sensitivity to
a safe level they are carried in a solution, as a
paste, wetted with water or with an inert solid.
Violent decomposition may be caused by traces
of impurities such as acids, metallic oxides or
amines. This decomposition may give rise to toxic
or inflammable gases.
Organic peroxides can be particularly dangerous
to the eyes. Immediate medical attention is nec-
essary following contact.
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Some organic peroxides begin to decompose at
low temperatures and it is therefore necessary to
transport them in a refrigerated unit. Should the
cooling unit suffer a breakdown and the temperature
rises above a certain value, rapid decomposition of
the peroxide will occur which could lead to an
explosion if not checked. It is good practice to
transport two such units in tandem, each half
loaded, so that transfer can be effected to a work-
ing unit should one break down.
The general introduction and the introduction
to the class contain information concerning temp-
erature control with specific temperature require-
ments given on the schedule.
Packages containing organic peroxides should be
moved away from the seat of a fire or jettisoned
otherwise an explosion may result. If this is not
possible, packages should be sprayed with large
quantities of water from a safe distance. Even
when the fire has been extinguished, packages con-
taining organic peroxides should be treated with
great care as they may explode violently at any
time.
Some organic peroxides require subsidiary
hazard labels such as Class 1 (explosives) or a
Class 3 (inflammable liquid).
Class 6 - Poisonous (toxic) and infectious
substances
The Class is divided into two sub-classes. These
are Class 6.1 - Poisonous (toxic) substances and
Class 6.2 - Infectious substances. Substances in
Class 6.1 may cause death or serious injury if
swallowed, inhaled or absorbed by skin contact.
They are arranged into three packaging groups, in
descending order of risk. The introduction to the
class shows how this grouping is determined.
Fire-fighting precautions are basically the
same as those given for Class 3 (inflammable
liquids) but because of the high risk of poisoning
through fumes, the Code states that ships carrying
poisonous substances should always carry protective
clothing and self-contained breathing apparatus.
If a spillage occurs involVing toxic sub-
stances - such as liquid pesticides - decontaminat-
ion should be carried out by trained staff wearing
suitable clothing and equipment.
Class 6.2 includes substances containing
disease-producing micro-organisms. These substances
contain micro-organisms or their toxins which are
known or suspected to cause disease in animals or
humans.
The labels required for the various substances
in the class vary according to the substance's
properties. Most are reqUired to carry the 'poison'
label, but some carry a label indicating that the
substances is harmful to foodstuffs. In addition,
further labels may be reqUired, depending upon the
substance's properties.
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Class 7 - Radioactive substances (materials)
The provisions of this class are based upon the
principles of the International Atomic Energy
Agency's Regulations for the Safe Transport of
Radioactive Materials, 1973 (as amended). They
offer guidance to shipowners and others handling
packages in ports and on ships without necessarily
consulting IAEA regulations.
Basically, there are two types of packingE for
radioactive materials, A and B. The former used for
substances of lower radioactivity, the latter for
high levels of activity. Type B packing has to
undergo very stringent tests which include a drop
test, fire engulfment at 8500C for half an hour, and
total water immersion, without suffering significant
radiation leakage.
The practical unit of measurement of radio-
activity for transportation purposes is the Trans-
port Index, which simply described is that amount of
radiation measured at 1 metre from a package. On a
ship the maximum quantity of radioactive material
permitted in anyone location is determined by its
transport index, which must not exceed 50, separated
by 6 metres from any other radioactive material.
The total for a ship must not exceed 200.
The chemical hazards associated with some
radioactive materials far exceed those due to the
radioactivity. For example, uranium hexafluoride,
(UF 6), has little radiation hazard, but if a spill-
age occurs will evolve a highly corrosive and toxic
gas (hydrogen fluoride). Apart from bearing a
radioactive hazard label, uranium hexafluoride must
also bear subsidiary labels of 'Corrosive' and
'Poison'.
A substance is regarded as being radioactive if
it e@its more than 0.002 microcuries of radiation
per gram of material.
packing, labelling and placarding, segregation
and other requirements vary according to the radio-
activity of the material as indicated above. Radio-
active substances are divided into three categories,
depending upon radiation levels, category I white
being the least dangerous. Category II and III
labels are printed in yellow and white for addit-
ional emphasis. Category I white label has the
wording 'Principal Radioactive Content' and
'Activity of Contents ... Curies' across the front.
In addition to this, Category II and III labels have
the wording 'Transport Index this Package'.
Class 8 - Corrosives
Substances in this class can damage living tissue
and materials, in some cases very severely. Some of
them give off irritating or harmful vapours and
others are toxic or give off toxic gases. Some are
inflammable or give off inflammable gases under
certain conditions.
Some corrosives, alkalis such as sodium
hydroxide, attack metals such as aluminium and zinc
and dissolve them, others will corrode iron or
steel. Glass is corroded by fluorides.
Water can also affect some substances by making
them corrosive, by liberating gases and in a few
cases by generating heat.
In view of these differing properties, packing
and stowage are extremely important. The substances
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are divided into three packaging groups (group I
being the most dangerous). The introduction to the
class gives detailed information on the types of
packaging to be used.
Most fires involving corrosive substances can
be dealt with by any extinguishant, including water,
although those which are inflammable should be dealt
with in the same way as substances in Class 3 of the
Code and care should also be taken in view of the
high risk of poisoning through fumes.
Class 9 - Miscellaneous dangerous substances
This class includes substances which, for various
reasons, do not come within any of the other classes.
Because their properties are so varied, the individ-
ual schedules usually include detailed information
on stowage, labelling, packaging and other inform-
ation.
Substances in this class include aerosol dis-
pensers, some ammonium nitrate fertilizers, asbestos,
and safety matches.
Medical First Aid Guide for use in accidents
involving dangerous goods (MFAG)
The MFAG was developed in close co-operation with
the World Health Organisation and the International
Labour Organisation.
It is intended as a supplement to the Inter-
national Medical Guide for Ships (IMGS) although
issued as a separate publication.
The Guide was first adopted by the Maritime
Safety Committee in 1972. In December 1981, the
Sub-Committee on the Carriage of Dangerous Goods
completed what virtually amounts to a complete
revision of the Guide. The new version was adopted
by th~ MSC at its forty-sixth session in April
1982(,11.
The advice in the MFAG refers not only to the
substances listed in the IMDG Code but also to those
in Appendix B of the Code of Safe Practice for Solid
Bulk Cargoes.
It is intended to prOVide the advice necessary
if chemical poisoning is to be diagnosed and treated
within the limits of the facilities available on
board ships.
It covers such matters as diagnosis of poison-
ing; first aid; the complications of poisoning;
general toxic hazards; emergency treatment; chemical
tables, including indexes; and a list of medicines.
A table from the MFAG is reproduced below as an
example.
General Information
These chemicals are all corrosive, but they vary in
the degree of their severity. They may cause severe
chemical burns.
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RADIO FOR MEDICAL ADVICE
SIGNS AND SYMPTO~S
Skin Contact
There will be redness and
irritation. Strong acids cause
chemical burns with severe pai
Eye Contact
There is redness, irritation
and pain . Chemical burns may
occur
Inhalation
Weak acids and low concentrat-
ion of strong acids produce a
cough, tightness in the chest
and shortness of breath. High
concentrations of any acid may
cause breathlessness with
frothy sputum (pulmonary
oedema). Brochitis or
pneumonia can occur
Ingestion
Weak acids will give a burning
sensation in the mouth with
nausea and vomiting. Strong
acids can produce severe
vomiting with blood. Perforat-
ion of the gut can occur
Emergency Procedures
TREATMENT
Skin Contact
I~~~DIATE ACTION IS
REQUIRED
Emergency Treatment:
Eye Contact
IMMEDIATE ACTION IS
REQUIRED
Emergency Treatment:
Inhalation
Emergency Treatment:
Pulmonary oedema:
Bronchitis:
Pneumonia:
Ingestion
Emergency Treatment:
Internal bleeding:
Perforation of the
gut:
As no operation is 100% safe no matter how closely
regulations are followed, there is always the danger
that an accident will lead to an emergency. The
Medical First Aid Guide gives information on how
personal injuries should be tackled, and IMO has
also developed Emergency procedures for ships carry-
ing dangerous goods. These contain information
designed to protect the ship as well as those on
board .
The substances which appear in the IMDG Code
are all listed in the general index which gives the
product's UN number; its Emergency Schedule number
(EmS), Medical First Aid Guide (MFAG) Table number;
and the number of the page on which it appears in
the IMDG Code.
By looking up the substance in the index it is
a simple matter to ascertain the appropriate emer-
gency schedule. The schedules take the various
classes of the IMDG Code and divide the various
substances contained in each class into sections.
These give information on special eqUipment which
should be carried; emergency procedures; emergency
action in case of fire or spillage (remedial action
may vary depending on whether the substance is
stowed on deck or below deck) .
An example (Emergency Schedule 8-05) is given
on the following page .
An introduction gives general guidance on
dealing with emergencies and particular gUidance is
given on the emergency schedules.
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Under Section 2 (special emergency equipment),
for example, the procedures point out that special-
ised equipment normally available on land is not
likely to be available at sea. The EmS (Emergency
Schedules) therefore recommend essential equipment
which should be carried. Under Section 4 (emer-
gencyaction) the document states: "In general, the
recommendation is to wash spillages on deck over-
board with copious quantities of water ... disposal
of spilt dangerous goods overboard is a matter of
judgement by the master, bearing in mind that the
safety of the crew has priority over pollution of
the sea."
The emergency schedules currently in use were
approved by the MSC in December 1980 and circulated
to IMO Member States in March 1981. They replaced
schedules adopted in 1979.
(1) Early in 1982, amendments to the Code were
approved. They include changes to the general
introduction and various other sections as well
as the introduction of substantial new schedules.
See the changes in M Notice 1032.
(1) Flammable has the same meaning.
(~) See The Ship Captain's Medical Guide 21st ed.
pUblished by HMSO. From 1984 it is proposed that
it should be a statutory requirement for this
official manual to be carried in all British
ships .
EMERGENCY SCHEDULE 8-05
CORROSIVE SUBSTANCES, COMBUSTIBLE
Special Emergency Equipment to be carried
Protective clothing (boots, gloves, overalls,
headgear)
Self-contained breathing apparatus
Spray nozzles
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
West protective clothing and self-contained
breathing apparatus when dealing with SPILLAGE
,or FIRE.
EMERGENCY ACTION
SPILLAGE
FIRE
On deck
Wash overboard
with copious
quantities of
water
Use water spray
Under deck
Collect spillage,
where practicable,
(using absorbent
material for liquids)
for safe disposal.
Batten down, use
ship's fixed fire-
fighting installat-
ion. Otherwise adopt
action as for "on
deck".
First Aid - See IMO Medical First Aid Guide (MFAG)
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UN No. Substance or Article Remarks
1779 FORMIC ACID ) Turn ship off wind
1940 THIOGLYCOLIC ACID ))
2028 BOMBS, SMOKE, .... )
2262 N,N-DIMETHYLCARBAMOYL ))CHLORIDE )
2565 DICYCLOHEXYLAMINE )
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APPENDIX II
CODE FOR CHEMICAL SHIPS
Source: Robert J. Lakey,"IMO Codes £or Chemical and Gas
Carriers", The International Maritime Organi-
zation, Samir Mankabady, Ed. Croom Helm, London
and Sydney. 1984.
98
CODE fOR CHEMICAL SHIPS
The Subcommittee on Ship Peslgn and Equipment held
its first session in January 1968. From their first
discussions, it was evidentth~t international
safety standards were needed. ' ~ t was also clear
that the standards should be ·b~sed upon a concept of
total integrity and reliability.~f the cargo con-
tainment system. This is bec~use release of the
products could lead to widesprea~pollutionof the
sea and a~osphere with attendant.injury to crew
members, innocent people, and property. In order to
deal with the complexities of chemical transport-
ation, the Subcommittee established a special Ad Hoc
Working Group to develop the standards. Initially,
this Group consisted of representatives from Norway,
the United Kingdom, and the United States. The
Group was later joined by representatives from the
Netherlands, the Federal Republic of ,Germa ny , Italy,
Sweden and others . Industry groups which have
observer status at IMO, such as the International
Chember of Shipping, also assisted with the work.
The standards for chemical tankers were dev-
eloped over a three year period in which time 10
meetings of the Ad Hoc Work ing Group were held.
They were adopted in 1971 as Assembly Resolution
A.212(VII) - "Code for the Construction and Equip-
ment of Ships Carrying Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk".
In doing so, the Assembly invited all governments to
give effect to the Code as soon as possible.
Additionally, the Subcommittee (and the Ad hoc Work-
ing Group) prepared other recommendations which
pertain to chemical tanker safety. These included
"Interim Recommendations for Existing Ships Carrying
Dangerous Chemicals which are Liquid at Ambient
Temperatures and at Atmospheric Pressure" and "Rec-
ommendation on t he Tra in ing and Qualifications of
Officers and Crews of Sh ips Carrying Hazardous or
Noxious Chemicals in Bulk".
The Code is based upon a philosophy of relating
cargo containment features of ship design, con-
struction, and operation to the hazards and physical
properties of the various chemicals covered by the
Code.
The following discussion highlights the various
chaptErs of the Code.
Chapter I - General
Chapter 1 contains important information concerning
the application and scope of the Code.
The scope limits the Code's application to
tankships which transport bulk cargoes of dangerous
chemical substances. These are defined as products
which have significant fire hazards in excess of
petrcleum products, and products which have sig-
nificant hazards in addition to or other than flamm-
ability. (As a result of the MARPOL Convention, the
scope of the Code will be expanded to include water
pollution). Table I is a listing of products which
were evaluated and determined to meet the above
criteria. Many other products were also evaluated
and determined not to be within the scope of the
Code. They are listed in Chapter VII of the Code.
The United States National Academy of Science Hazard
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LvaluatlOn ~ystem was used as a basic guide for
evaluating whether a product was within the scope of
the Code. Hazard evaluation systems developed in
Norway and the United Kingdom assisted in making
these definitions.
. . The Code applies only to cargoes which are
llqulds at normal temperatures. Liquefied gases
were excluded so that the Code could be completed in
a more timely manner. (As will be discussed in a
late~ section, a separate Code was prepared for gas
c a r r i e r s ) •
. The Code applies to both existing and new
cheml~al tankers. previously, it had been the
practlce to apply newly developed standards to ships
constructed after the standards had been adopted.
Because of the port s~fety considerations, it was
agreed that an upgradlng of existing chemical tank-
ers .should comply with the Code. A phased time
p~rlod was developed for existing ships to comply
wlth the varlOUS standards. Compliance with
requirements for personnel protection was expectea
immediately, while up to six years was permitted in
order to comply with those involving major ship
modif ication, e.g., installation of a double bottom,
etc. Also, it was acknowledged that full compliance
might not be possible in all cases; therefore,
certain types of dispensations were permitted.
Chapter II - Cargo Containment
This chapter contains features of major significance
to the design of ships. For the first time, meas-
ures to prevent the cargo from release were incorp-
orated into ship design standards. Recognising the
probability that damage resulting from collision or
ground ing could lead to uncontrolled release of the
cargo, three degrees of protection for the cargoes
were developed. The degrees of physical protection,
or 'ship types', define the location of the cargo
with respect to the ship's side and bottom and the
extent to which a ship should be capable of remain-
ing afloat after damage. The assignment of ship
types to the various cargoes takes into account the
nature and severity of the product's hazard to the
environment should it be released. The more severe
requirements are imposed against the more hazardous
substances.
The highest standard of physical protection,
Type I ship, is required for those substances
considered to have the greatest environment hazard,
i.e. if released, the cargo would have wide reaching
effects beyond the immediate neighbourhood of the
ship. Tanks containing Type I products are required
to be located inboard from the ship's side a dis-
tance equivalent to 1/5 the ship's beam. The tank's
bottom must also be located above the ship's bottom
a distance equal to 1/15 the ship's beam. Further,
a Type I ship must be able to survive certain def-
ined damage anywhere in its length, including the
engineroom, and remain in an upright stable con-
dition.
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A Type 11 Sh~p ~s requ~reo to transport those
cargoes which would present a significant hazard to
the ship and crew if released. The release of a
type II cargo would not have the same far-reaching
effects as a type I product. Type II tanks must be
located at least 760mm from the ship's side and
above the bottom of the ship a distance equivalent
to 1/15 the ship's beam. This tanK location pro-
vides cargo protection against low energy collisions
and groundings which often occur to ships in port.
The survivability requirement for a Type II ship is
based upon ship length. A Type II ship over 150
metres in length must meet the same survival require--
ments as a Type I ship. Type II ships less than 150
metres in length must be able to withstand the
defined damage anywhere in the cargo area and,
separately, withstand flooding of the engineroom.
Type III ships are required for the remaining
products covered by the Code. Type III ships are
very similar to the petroleum product tanker, i.e.,
a single skin tanker , although it is significant to
note that they are required to meet a higher stand-
ard survivability than is required for an oil tanker.
Cargo Segregation
Many of the chemicals which are transported on chem-
ical tankers will react violently if accidently
mixed with other chemicals. Therefore, the Code
requires that incompatible cargoes be physically
separated on the ship by a cofferdam, void space, or
mutually compatible cargo. Similarly, the piping
and tank vent systems for incompatible cargoes must
be completely separate. The Code does not specify
which products are reactive; however, this inform-
ation is available from other sources, e.g., the
U.S. Coast Guard.
Chapter II also develops in detail additional
requirements on the location and arrangement of the
accommodation space, machinery spaces, cargo pump-
room, cargo piping and hose, tank vent systems, tank
gauging systems, etc.
Chapter III - Safety Eguipment and Related
Considerations
One of the major objectives of the Code is to make
each chemical ship a safe working environment for
its operating personnel. A chemical ship is alive
with various operations, such as transferring cargo,
cleaning tanks and other similar operations, each of
which presents hazards to the vessel's personnel.
Within Chapter III are the folloWing major sections:
1. Requirements for ventilation of cargo handling
spaces .
2. Standards for electrical equipment .
3. Standards for the gauging of cargo tanks.
4. Standards for fire protection.
:,. Standards for personnel protection.
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Chapter IV - Special Requirements
Chapter IV contains special requirements which
extend the Code's more general parts. This is to
recognise the unusual hazards or properties of
certain products . These special requirements are
grouped into three subject areas as follows:
Individual Cargoes - This section contains
specific requirements which address unusual
hazards or characteristics of certain products.
For example, the extreme flammability of carbon
disulfide is addressed with special require-
ments for eliminating sources of ignition.
Groups of Products - This section draws special
attention to hazards of certain groups of
products. For example, monomers have a tend-
ency to polymerise under certain conditions.
This tendency can be controlled by introducing
small amounts of an inhibitor into the liquid
cargo. The special requirement for the monomer
group of products deals with the proper
inhibition of those cargoes.
Construction and Equipment - This series of
special requirements directs attention to the
need for certain types of equipment and/or
materials of construction when designing ships
to carry certain products.
Chapter V - Operatin~ Requirements
This chapter is mainly a summary of the various
operating requirements contained in other parts of
the Code. When the chapter was prepared, the
International Chamber of Shipping was preparing a
comprehensive safety guide for chemical tankers
which would supplement the Code. Therefore, the
chapter was purposefully kept brief.
One operating requirement is of major signif-
icance. It establishes cargo size limits for Type
I and II ships. The limits are as follows:
-The quantity of a cargo required to be carried
in a Type I ship should not exceed 1250 cubic
metres in anyone tank.-
-The quantity of a cargo required to be carried
in a Type II ship should not exceed 3000 cubic
metres in anyone tank.-
There was considerable debate over whether size
limits should be imposed on chemical tankers . Some
delegations were of the opinion that cargo size
limits should be determined by national authorities
based upon local conditions. Others felt that the
Code's success depended on its containing inter-
nationally agreed cargo size limits. Much of the
discussion centred upon the likely effect of a part-
icular limit. As recorded in the Code's preamble,
it was finally decided to include the above limits
as -holding figures- on the condition that further
in-depth studies would be conducted. It is perhaps
worthy to note that the Subcommittee had previously
developed the formula for limiting the size of cargo
tanks on crude oil tankers. That formula was sub-
sequently incorporated into the 1969 Amendments to
the 1954 Convention for Prevention of Pollution of
the Sea by Oil and the MARPOL Convention.
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Chapter VI - Summary of Minimum Requirements
Table 2 is an extract from the "Surr~ary of Minimum
Requirements". Chapter VIII serves as the vital
link for communicating the Code's requirements.
However, what is more · significant is that the "Sum-
mary of Minimum Requirements" represents a system-
atic approach to considering the hazard potential,
the physical properties of the products in their
transported state, and the various degrees of con-
tainment. At the time of the Code's preparation,
full agreement could not be reached on a single
hazard evaluation system and criteria for relating
the hazards to the various degree of containment
included in the other chapters. Instead, each res-
pective delegation utilised a different system.
Remarkably, agreement was reached rather qUickly on
the requirements for the products. More recently,
guidelines for evaluating new products have been
developed and are being used when amending the Code .
The guidelines are available from IMO.
Impact of the Chemical Code
Prior to 1968, most of the 'chemical tankers' were
petroleum product tankers which had been converted
to carry chemicals. The degree of conversion varied
considerably. In most instances, the 1968 chemical
tanker was a single skin tanker which had some mod-
ification to the piping and venting systems, but
little else. In a few cases, the tanker had been
modified extensively by installing a double bottom,
independent stainless steel tanks and separate pump-
ing, piping and venting systems for each tank.
Because of its application to existing ships, the
Code has impacted each of the 1968 tankers. By
1983, most of the 1968 tonnage has been either
scrapped or p laced in other service. The fleet has
more than doubled in size during the 1968-1983 time
frame, and now the average age is approximately 7
years. The Code has, of course, impacted each of
the new ships. A sophisticated fleet now exists
which consists mainly of double skin Type II ships.
The Code has also had a beneficial impact upon
national administrations. The Code has been im -
plemented by 12 countries and is applied on a vol-
untary basis by 9 other countries . The countries
are listed in Table 3. Ships with proper Code
certificates are now accepted by many countries that
were preViously applying unilateral regulations.
Other countries are reqUiring that chemical ships
meet the Code as a condition of entry into their
ports.
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